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Abstract 
 
Random experiments could allow the government to test tax policies 
before enactment into general law. Such experiments can be 
revenue-neutral, with the tax authority ensuring ex post that average 
tax revenues received from taxpayers in the treatment and control 
groups are equal. Taxpayers might thus volunteer even for 
experiments that would broaden the tax base, for example by 
eliminating deductions. Continued participation by taxpayers in 
such experiments would indicate that the proposed reforms are 
efficient at least if externalities are disregarded. Non-revenue-
neutral experiments raise greater concerns about horizontal 
inequity, but may be helpful in addressing questions about effects of 
tax rates and in increasing participation.  
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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 is an experiment on a grand scale. If, 
as critics claim, the statute encourages expensive tax avoidance strategies that will 
lead to even lower tax revenues than projected,2 the inefficiencies and budget 
strains3 will be national in scope. The experiment has no control group. If the 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  The bill was entitled the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” until 
right before it passed, when the Senate parliamentarian ruled that the title violated reconciliation 
rules.  As a result, the final bill was entitled “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles 
II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.”  Most commentators 
continue to refer to the bill as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (or TCJA).  See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, 
Eyes Turn Toward 2018 Tasks as Tax Reform Becomes Law, 158 TAX NOTES 28 (Jan. 1, 2018) 
(“The law, known informally as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97)…”); Amy Hamilton, 
Connecticut Finds a SALT Workaround That Would Actually Work, TAX ANALYSTS, Feb. 26, 2018 
(referring without qualification to the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”).  
2 David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on the Conference Committee Tax Bill 
(Feb. 26, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423 
(identifying numerous mechanisms that taxpayers may use to avoid taxes as a result of the tax 
reform).  
3 The official estimate of the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation is 
that the tax changes will cause an increase in deficits over 10 years of $1.8 trillion. See 
  TAX EXPERIMENTATION  4 
 
 
economy grows rapidly over the next few years, reform proponents will likely take 
credit, while critics will insist that the economic growth was exogenous.4 Both sides 
will make their case with anecdotal evidence rather than the results of randomized 
experiments that economists generally prefer.5 Scholars have identified an 
empirical deficit in tax scholarship,6 but because federal tax law exhibits little 
exogenous variation,7 the deficit is difficult to correct.8 
This Article describes an approach to tax reform that might have been and 
that still might be: an experimental approach, in which proposed reforms are tested 
initially on groups of willing taxpayers. In recent years, the legal literature has 
focused attention on the design9 and justifiability10 of randomized government 
policy, in areas including consumer protection,11 securities law,12 patent law,13 and 
even regulation of food safety.14 Randomized experiments produce the best 
attainable evidence of the effect of legal policies on behavior, but the only known 
                                                 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATED DEFICITS AND DEBT UNDER THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT OF H.R. 1 (2018), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53437.  
4 Economists had different estimates of the efficiency consequences of the last large tax reform. See 
Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J. ECON. 
LIT. 589, 619-20 (1997). 
5 See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research, 
9 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1995). 
6 See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito II et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of U.S. Tax Court 
Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523, 526 (2011) (“Many authors have noted the absence of 
empirical research in tax law,” an article a few years ago complained.”); Nancy Staudt, Empirical 
Taxation, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2003) (“[T]he literature gives legislators little guidance 
for selecting one proposal from another in the wide array of sound policy options.”).  
7 The exceptional rigorous analyses of changes in federal law prove the rule. Ed Fox, for example, 
analyzes the effect of federal tax law on marriage by exploiting differences in state laws that led the 
federal law to apply differently in different states at the same time. See Edward Fox, Do Taxes Affect 
Marriage? Lessons from History (2017) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
8 The deficit may also exist in part because tax law professors prefer theory to empirics. See Staudt, 
supra note 6, at 2 (“[F]ew attempt to test whether their hypotheses hold true in the real world.”). But 
even in a conference on tax empiricism, none of the papers directly assessed the effects of federal 
law. See id. at 5-8 (describing the contributions). With greater policy variation, especially random 
variation, scholarship would likely follow. 
9 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011). 
10 See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 1035 (2015). 
11 See Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 31 (2015). 
12 See Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2015). 
13 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015). 
14 See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (2017). 
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randomized experiments involve tax procedure15 and welfare,16 not substantive tax 
law. Interest in the effects of tax law on taxpayer behavior pervades the literature,17 
has been virtually no consideration of whether tax law might benefit from 
systematic randomized experiments.18  
Tax law, however, is a promising field in which the government might run 
randomized experiments. The large number of taxpayers should make it possible to 
find voluntary treatment groups that are small relative to the population, yet large 
enough to generate statistical power.19 Each tax change would apply to a random 
selection of qualified taxpayers agreeing to opt in to the experiment, thus producing 
both a treatment group and a control group still subject to the status quo law. 
Experiments might test multiple tax law changes, disentangling any resulting 
interaction effects when individual taxpayers are in multiple treatment groups.20 
Meanwhile, tax experiments could be much cheaper than many other forms of legal 
experimentation, because the existing obligation to file tax forms21 provides the 
government much of the evidence that it might need to assess the effects of an 
experiment.  
A plausible explanation for the lack of attention to tax experimentation lies 
in tax law’s core value of horizontal equity.22 This value makes especially salient 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, READYRETURN PILOT: TAX YEAR 2004 
STUDY RESULTS (2006) (reporting results of an experiment on sending taxpayers pre-filled returns), 
available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/TY04RRFinalReport.pdf. Id. at 2. But the survey 
reported no results on perhaps the most interesting question, whether control group taxpayers paid 
more or less tax than treatment group taxpayers. Id. at 29-30 (comparing treatment group taxpayers 
reported state and federal income, but ignoring control group taxpayers); cf. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., 
Intuit’s Nine Lies Kill State E-Filing Programs and Keep ‘Free’ File Alive, TAX ANALYSTS SPECIAL 
REPORT, Aug. 30, 2010, at 555, 559 (arguing that taxpayers using ReadyReturn paid no more taxes 
than others, but without any comparisons between taxpayers and control group to support this 
argument). 
16 See DAVID KERSHAW & JERILYN FAIR, 1 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT: 
OPERATIONS, SURVEYS, AND ADMINISTRATION (1976). 
17 See, e.g., William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 375 
(2009). 
18 A rare exception is the following single sentence: “Conceivably, field experiments could be 
designed where individuals are randomly assigned to different tax schedules in the spirit of the older 
negative income tax experiments in the United States.” Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of 
Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 43 
(2012) (referring to experiments mentioned infra note 24 and accompanying text). 
19 See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 98, 
98 (1992) (noting that statistical power depends on sample size). 
20 See generally JIM JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
(2003) (describing techniques for identifying interactions between multiple variables of interests). 
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6012 (specifying who must file U.S. federal tax returns). 
22 Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
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concerns that experiments necessarily produce unequal treatment of similarly 
situated individuals. Randomly assigning some taxpayers to a tax law change 
violates horizontal equity, because those taxpayers would then be treated 
differently from similarly situated taxpayers not so assigned. This concern 
diminishes if the treatment is a tax break. Randomized government experiments 
offering benefits are widely considered ethical,23  and random experiments granting 
low-income individuals have occurred.24 Experiments often offer the treatment 
group something denied to the control group. In medical experiments, some patients 
who hope for a new treatment instead receive placebo.25 If uncertainty about 
relative efficacy suffices to justify medical experiments,26 then legal experiments 
should be similarly defensible. 
There are, however, problems with tax experiments limited to tax breaks. 
First, experimentation becomes a one-way ratchet, always expected to lower tax 
revenues. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act increases deficits,27 so future policymakers 
may need to raise more revenue, not to select further tax breaks. Second, tax policy 
questions susceptible to experimentation often involve trade-offs, for example 
whether taxpayers might be better off with higher rates but more deductions. Third, 
taxpayers opting in to tax experiments will generally be well-advised and wealthy,28 
so experimentation on tax breaks will often be inherently regressive. 
These concerns, however, reflect a fallacy. If treatment group taxpayers 
benefit relative to the control group, then it might seem that all other taxpayers lose. 
After all, if some pay less revenue to the government, then others bear a higher 
                                                 
1116, 1116 (2002) (“[T]here is virtual unanimity that horizontal equality—the extent to which 
equals are treated equally—is a worthy goal of any tax system.”).   
23 See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 968 (“[W]hen scarce resources are distributed, 
randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in a way that limits rent-
seeking.”). For a detailed treatment of ethical issues in social experiments, see ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975). 
24 See, e.g., KERSHAW & FAIR, supra note 16. 
25 The use of a placebo was initiated by Austin Flint in 1862. See AUSTIN FLINT, A TREATISE ON 
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE 1019-20 (4th ed. 1873). 
26 The literature on research ethics suggests that experiments are permissible where practitioners are 
in “clinical equipoise” about the best course of treatment. A critique is that a doctor’s individualized 
obligation is not to choose among treatments at random, but to choose a treatment thought to be best 
given available information for each individual patient. See Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, 
Clinical Equipoise and the Incoherence of Research Ethics, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 151, 156 (2007) 
(arguing that clinical equipoise is an incoherent theory and that ethical obligations in research are 
distinct from those in clinical settings). 
27 See supra note 3. 
28 The government has sought to address this concern by providing grants for Low Income Taxpayer 
Clinics. See Internal Revenue Service, Low Income Taxpayer Clinics 
https://www.irs.gov/advocate/low-income-taxpayer-clinics (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
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proportion of taxation’s overall burden. But taxpayers in the treatment group might 
benefit while paying the same level of tax on average as taxpayers in the control 
group. Many proposals for tax reform purport to correct inefficiencies in the tax 
code. Changes that remove economic distortions could be combined with rate 
changes in ways that would improve taxpayer welfare while maintaining 
government revenue.  
This observation leads to the following insight: tax experiments can be 
revenue neutral by design.29 The treatment group in such an experiment on average 
pays taxes as high as the control group. Revenue neutrality substantially addresses 
the problems above. A revenue-neutral experiment is not a one-way ratchet; 
instead, it allows questions of economic efficiency to be assessed independent of 
normative questions about overall tax levels and about the distribution of the tax 
burden across income and other groups.30 Revenue-neutral experiments necessarily 
allow the government to assess the impact of trade-offs. Even if only relatively 
wealthy taxpayers opt into these experiments, they would be guaranteed to pay as 
much in taxes as they would absent experimentation. Participating taxpayers 
anticipate benefiting from the trade-offs embodied by experiment, but not at the 
direct expense of other taxpayers. Their experience, moreover, may help generate 
tax reform of broader benefit.  
What combination of tax changes might serve as the subject of a tax 
experiment? Consider, as a simple (at the risk of being trivial) illustration, the recent 
tax reform’s limitations on the deductibility of entertainment expenses.31 Under 
prior law, taxpayers could deduct expenses such as tickets for a sporting event used 
to entertain a client,32 but taxpayers can no longer do so. A longstanding argument 
                                                 
29 Commentators have often suggested that tax reform should be revenue neutral. See Jason S. Oh, 
Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2017) (“In the current fiscal 
environment, it is widely accepted that any tax reform should not lose any revenue…. Revenue-
neutrality is particularly relevant in base-broadening reform ….”). But revenue neutrality has not 
been discussed in connection with experimentation. 
30 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will result by 2027 in 
a lower percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively high incomes and a 
higher percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively low incomes. See JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 
1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 5 (Dec. 18, 2017), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5054 (projecting, for example, that 
taxpayers with income of $1,000,000 or over will contribute 18.9% of total taxes, instead of 19.1% 
of total taxes under prior law). 
31 I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) as amended by Pub. L. 115-97 § 13304(a)(1)(A) (“No deduction otherwise 
allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item… With respect to an activity which is of 
a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation”).   
32 Entertainment expenses were deductible if they were “directly related” to or “associated with” the 
taxpayer’s trade or business.  I.R.C. § 274(a) (2012); Walliser v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 433 (1974) 
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for restricting deductibility of such expenses is that taxpayers derive utility from 
such expenditures.33 Because the recipient of entertainment benefits generally need 
not include the benefits in income,34 deductibility immunizes such expenditures 
from taxation.35  
Limitations on the entertainment deduction might seem a poor candidate for 
experimentation, because no one would volunteer for increased tax liability. 
Whatever the act’s overall merits, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act demonstrates the 
political palatability of bundling taxpayer-unfriendly changes with taxpayer-
friendly changes. A limitation on deductibility was joined to a rate reduction. The 
entertainment deduction limits recouped only a tiny fraction of the revenue loss 
from other parts of the tax bill.36 But the lobbyists’ embrace or at least grudging 
acceptance of this tax reform, as opposed to a reform that lowered rates less with 
no change to entertainment expense deductibility, suggests that the deduction was 
distortionary. It is hard to tell for sure.37 But the example conceptually demonstrates 
that taxpayers should embrace revenue-neutral tax changes that remove 
decisionmaking distortions. 
How might an experiment on entertainment deductibility have worked? 
Taxpayers could have volunteered to give up their entertainment deductions. The 
                                                 
(finding otherwise deductible entertainment expenses failed both “directly related” and “associated 
with” tests).   
33 President Kennedy expressed this argument clearly: “Even though in some instances 
entertainment and related expenses have an association with the needs of business, they nevertheless 
confer substantial tax-free personal benefits to the recipients.” Hearings on Tax Recommendations 
of the President Contained in His Message Transmitted to Congress Before the House Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (Apr. 20, 1961). 
34 See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (1968) (holding that taxpayer had no gross income 
from travel and apparent entertainment expenses provided by automobile manufacturer who wanted 
taxpayer to open a dealership); see also I.R.C. § 132(a)(3) & (d) (excluding fringe benefits from 
employee’s gross income when the expenditures would have been deductible by the employee if 
paid by the employee him- or herself).   
35 The issues raised by the entertainment deduction arise as well with other potentially deductible 
expenses, such as expenses for meals, home offices, and education. For an early reform proposal 
accounting for these connections, see Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living 
Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974). 
36 The TCJA’s limitation on meal and entertainment expenses was estimated by the nonpartisan 
Joint Committee on Taxation to raise $23.5 billion over the 10-year budget window.  See Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, 
The "Tax Cuts And Jobs Act", Fiscal Years 2018-2027, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2017) (Rep. No. JCX-67-17), 
available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.  
37 The combination of large corporation tax rate reductions with limitations on certain business 
deductions might be attributed to a political motive to highlight large reductions, if those reductions 
are greater in salience than the deduction limitations. [difficulty of inferring intent of multimember 
body] 
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carrot to induce participation would be that these taxpayers would receive lower 
rates, just low enough that government tax revenues would be identical. If the 
government selected this rate, it might miscalculate or intentionally set the rate low, 
disguising a tax cut as an experiment.38 But there is a simple antidote: The law 
authorizing such experiments could provide that the total tax liability of treatment 
group taxpayers will be multiplied by a factor sufficient to ensure that revenues 
from these taxpayers will equal in the aggregate the revenues that they would have 
paid, as extrapolated from payments by control group taxpayers. For example, if 
the average treatment group taxpayer’s liability when measured after limiting 
interest deductions would have been 1% more than the average control group 
taxpayer’s liability, then each treatment group taxpayer might be given 
approximately a 1% discount on the nominal reported tax liability, calculated 
without granting the entertainment deduction.39  
With so simple a formula for achieving revenue neutrality, the taxpayers 
most likely to opt in will be those that in the absence of the experiment would claim 
a relatively small entertainment deduction anyway. This would be unfortunate, as 
the greatest tax distortion presumably involves taxpayers who take large 
entertainment deductions. But a more sophisticated approach could calculate a 
custom multiplier for each participant. A statistical model developed after the 
experiment would feature ex ante attributes of the treatment and control group 
taxpayers, including previous entertainment expenses, as independent variables. 
The model would predict total tax liability reported by both control and treatment 
group taxpayers during the experimental period. If the model predicted that a 
taxpayer would have liability 3% higher if assigned to the control group, then the 
taxpayer would receive approximately a 3% tax rate reduction on the nominal 
reported tax liability if assigned to treatment. A treatment taxpayer’s entertainment 
expenditures would not reduce tax liability, and the taxpayer therefore would have 
incentives to reduce entertainment expenditures on the margin.  
This approach can equally be used to experiment on the possibility of new 
deductions. For example, currently tax law does not allow taxpayers to deduct 
commuting expenses.40 Commuting expenses may be seen either as enabling 
taxpayers to travel to work or as enabling taxpayers to live away from work, so the 
normative case for deductibility is close.41 An experiment might test deductibility 
                                                 
38 Cf. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings 
Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1148 (2006) (criticizing purported tax reform proposals as 
“amount[ing] to little more than a disguised tax cut for high-income individuals”). 
39 More precisely, the tax payment multiplier would be (100 / 101) to ensure revenue neutrality, so 
the discount is approximately 0.99%.  
40 I.R.C. § 262; Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).   
41 See generally Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX. REV. 185, 201-34 (2006) (analyzing policy 
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for all or only in limited circumstances, such as for commuting to an employer 
located far from affordable housing. Treatment group taxpayers would receive the 
deduction offered but would pay higher tax rates to maintain revenue neutrality 
relative to the control group. This could facilitate efficient behavioral changes, for 
example leading a taxpayer to work for an employer further away.42 Or, the 
experiment might fail, suggesting the efficiency of the status quo.  
Revenue-neutral tax experiments cannot answer all normative questions 
about tax law changes. First, these experiments assess efficiency only. A full 
normative analysis should embrace distributional concerns as well, which have 
received increased attention as inequality nationally has widened.43 Nonetheless, 
the practice of revenue-neutral experimentation could promote attention to 
distributional issues. Some critics of the recent tax law changes argue that these 
changes amounted to a regressive tax cut disguised as tax reform.44 Experimentation 
could generate relatively uncontroversial tax reform measures, reducing the need 
for omnibus tax reform packages focused on efficiency. A tax package featuring 
untested or rejected efficiency measures might face criticism. Experimentation 
could thus foster a policy culture in which distributional issues are considered 
directly and acknowledged as policy choices, rather than assumed to be inevitable 
epiphenomena of other tax policies.45  
Second, the experimental approach assumes that taxpayers internalize 
benefits of tax law provisions, but tax provisions may be motivated by anticipated 
third-party effects. For example, the mortgage interest tax deduction is purportedly 
motivated by a desire to provide incentives for home ownership, which supposedly 
generates positive externalities.46 Many scholars are skeptical of this justification,47 
                                                 
arguments); Ronald S. Ross, Should Deductible Commuting Be Contingent on Principal-Place-of-
Business Criteria?, 83 J. TAX’N 88 (1995) (summarizing legal developments and arguments). 
42 This argument is strongest if the taxpayer’s residence is effectively fixed. See William A. Klein, 
Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of 
“Simple” Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 880 (1969). 
43 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017) (documenting 
increased equality within nations). 
44 See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, You Cannot Be Too Cynical About the Republican Tax Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/opinion/republican-tax-
bill-trump-corker.html. 
45 Robert Shiller has proposed that the government specify in advance the maximum level of 
inequality. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 149-
64 (2003).  
46 See, e.g., Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354 (1999) (finding evidence that homeownership 
causes greater investment in social capital). 
47 See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not 
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 191- 92 (2009); Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen 
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but the experimental approach that we describe here does not provide a means for 
measuring such externalities or their absence. It might, however, be possible to 
design an experiment that can overcome this concern by experimenting at a level 
other than that of a taxpayer. For example, a homeowner’s association might be 
allowed to opt in on behalf of all owners of homes in the association. If we assume 
that this level internalizes externalities, then the willingness of such associations to 
participate would suggest that the benefits of the proposed treatment exceed the 
costs. 
Third, revenue-neutral experiments cannot easily assess the macroeconomic 
consequences of changes in tax rates. Revenue neutrality would undo an isolated 
tax rate change. Proponents justify important features of the recent tax reform, such 
as the reduction in corporate tax rates48 and the allowance of reduced rates for 
certain passthrough income,49 on the ground that they will improve the overall 
economic climate, thus benefiting workers as well as owners of capital.50 Non-
revenue-neutral tax experiments may thus be needed.51 For example, the 
government might have selected random taxpayers to receive a 1% tax reduction in 
passthrough income and assessed the effects of such a reduction. Such experiments 
can provide information beyond the power of revenue-neutral tax experiments, at 
the cost of more serious horizontal equity objections. Without the revenue-
neutrality constraint, the government can also grant inducements to participants in 
tax experiments, such as a promise that treatment taxpayers will pay on average 
less than control taxpayers. Such inducements could reduce concerns about adverse 
selection and enable experiments with treatment groups covering many reforms.52 
With non-revenue-neutral experiments, success must be based on defined 
criteria, such as whether treatment businesses hire more employees. With opt-in 
revenue-neutral experiments, success can be measured based on the willingness of 
taxpayers to opt in, once early experimental periods produce information about the 
likely trade-offs. Such experiments can do little harm. At worst, only a few 
taxpayers, potentially unrepresentative, will participate, and the experiment will 
                                                 
Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011). 
48 I.R.C. 11(b), as amended by Pub. L. 115-97 § 13001(a) (cutting corporate tax rate from 35% to 
21%).  
49 I.R.C. § 199A, added by Pub.L. 115-97 § 11011(a).  
50 See Martin A. Sullivan, Corporate Tax Incidence Made Simple, 157 Tax Notes 454 (Oct. 23, 
2017) (providing overview of the evidence that cutting corporate tax rates will, to some extent, 
benefit workers).   
51 MARK P. KEIGHTLY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND PROPERTY 
TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 8–11 (Mar. 18, 2014) (reviewing the literature on 
whether the home mortgage interest deduction creates positive externalities to justify the tax 
benefit), reprinted in 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-17. 
52 See infra Part III.A. 
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never scale up. If the experiment does scale, taxpayers would come to learn what 
tax rate discount or increase they might expect in exchange for the new tax 
treatment. Unless virtually all taxpayers wish to be part of an experiment, the 
government should be cautious in making an experiment permanent, because 
opting-in taxpayers are self-selected. The government therefore might transition 
gradually, by making an opt-in experiment opt-out and then ultimately mandatory.53 
Alternatively, the government might allow all taxpayers to opt into the treatment 
group, without requiring it of any taxpayers. 
Part I will describe revenue-neutral tax experiments in more detail, 
illustrating how they can be used to assess a wide range of tax policies. Part II will 
identify challenges for revenue-neutral experimentation, including scaling up 
experiments, addressing concerns about horizontal and vertical equity, countering 
the danger of taxpayer manipulation, and testing tax expenditures and other policies 
with goals beyond efficiency. Finally, Part III will consider non-revenue-neutral 
experiments. It will explain how such experiments can induce greater participation 
on a wider range of issues and can study the effect of changing marginal tax rates. 
It also describes the possibility of self-executing tax experiments, in which the law 
automatically will change in a direction indicated by the experimental results, and 
experiments in which individual taxpayers are not the unit of experimentation. 
I. REVENUE-NEUTRAL TAX EXPERIMENTS 
This Part discusses how the government might use revenue-neutral tax 
experiments to assess the efficiency of various features of the tax code. The 
approaches described here might be used by the U.S. federal government, by state 
or local governments, or by foreign governments. Thus, while we will use 
provisions from the Internal Revenue Code and recent tax reform statutes and 
proposals as examples, our analysis is not dependent on the structure of the U.S. 
income tax system. Part I.A elaborates the entertainment deduction experiment 
discussed in the introduction, and Part I.B describes other potential tax experiments. 
A. A Hypothetical Experiment 
The goal of revenue-neutral tax experimentation is to identify potential sets 
of changes to tax law that in combination would provide the government the same 
amount of revenue but that would reduce distortion of economic activity. This 
section elaborates how an experiment might have tested the ultimately adopted 
reform of removing the entertainment expenses deduction.  
                                                 
53 See infra Part II.A. 
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1. The Potential Benefit to Taxpayers 
Why might a taxpayer be interested in the combination of tax rate reduction 
and loss of the deduction, assuming the taxpayer anticipates paying around the same 
amount as before? Consider a taxpayer with gross income of $110,000, a tax rate 
of 25%,54 and $10,000 in certain entertainment expenses deductible under what we 
will assume is current law. Further, suppose that this taxpayer receives $8,000 in 
subjective value from these expenses. That is, the taxpayer would be equally happy 
if the taxpayer could reallocate the $10,000 entertainment expenses to $2,000 in 
taxes and $8,000 in cash. In the table below, this is listed as Scenario 1. Of course, 
not all taxpayers would value $83,000 in take-home pay as much as $75,000 plus 
$10,000 in entertainment expenses, but some might. Our immediate burden is not 
to show that a revenue-neutral change would be good for all taxpayers, just that it 
might be good for some.  
 
Table 1. Hypothetical effects of an experiment 
 Gross 
income 
Entertain
-ment 
Expenses 
Taxable 
income 
Tax rate Taxes Take 
home 
income 
Status quo $110K $10K $100K 25% $25K $75K 
Scenario 1 $110K $0 $110K 24.5% $27K $83K 
Scenario 2 $108K $2K $106K 23.5% $25K $81K 
This scenario illustrates that a tax law change can make the government 
better off (receiving $2,000 more in revenue) while making a taxpayer no worse 
off. Though such tax changes are a plausible policy goal, a taxpayer would have no 
incentive to take the trouble to opt into such an experiment. The fact that this tax 
law change produces a surplus of $2,000, however, suggests that it is possible to 
imagine a tax law change that could make this hypothetical taxpayer better off and 
the government no worse off. Consider, for example, Scenario 2. Here, we assume 
that the taxpayer spends $2,000 on entertainment and this reduction in spending 
leaves the taxpayer with only $108,000 in gross income. With a 23.5% tax rate, the 
taxpayer pays $25,000 in taxes, leaving the taxpayer with $81,000 in take home 
income. Some taxpayers might prefer this to the status quo. If not, then the 
experiment would simply fail.  
                                                 
54 These numbers are chosen to make the math easy, not to reflect the intricacies of the tax code. A 
more realistic example would take into factors such as the standard deduction. See I.R.C. § 63(c) 
(allowing taxpayers to deduct a fixed amount of money in lieu of itemizing deductions). 
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2. Adjustments to Ensure Revenue Neutrality 
The sizes of the treatment and control groups could be equal, but that is not 
necessary. The advantage of using an equal number of taxpayers in each group is 
that this provides the greatest statistical power.55 If either group is sufficiently small, 
then any differences between the two groups are more likely to be attributable to 
noise. On the other hand, placing most opting-in taxpayers in the treatment group 
maximizes the number who may receive their preferred tax treatment. For ease of 
exposition, however, we will assume that the groups are the same size. 
The simplest technique for achieving revenue neutrality would be to 
calculate the quotient of the total taxes paid by the control group divided by the 
total taxes calculated by the treatment group, prior to applying a multiplier. Each 
taxpayer in the treatment group would then pay taxes equal to the amount the 
taxpayer reported, multiplied by this quotient. Suppose, for example, that the 
control group taxpayers paid a total of $1 billion in taxes, and the treatment group 
taxpayers reported a total of $1.04 billion in taxes. (A higher tax bill would be 
expected for this experiment, since the experiment is removing what we assume 
was a deduction available under current law.) Then, a treatment group taxpayer 
who had $100,000 in gross income would have reported $25,000 in taxes, 
regardless of the amount of entertainment expenses that the taxpayer incurred. Tax 
liability, however, would be only $25,000 * (1 / 1.04), or around $24,000.  
This approach to calculating the tax multiple enhances the likelihood that 
treatment group taxpayers will respond in the same way as they would if there were 
a broader change in tax law affecting all taxpayers. A taxpayer in the control group 
has experienced no legal change at all and thus should presumably behave in the 
same way as the taxpayer would have if the experiment had never occurred.56 We 
are assuming, of course, that the experiment is large enough that each member of 
the treatment group will have only a negligible effect on the tax ratio. If we 
imagined the opposite—an experiment with two taxpayers, one in the treatment 
group and one in the control group—then the treatment taxpayer would expect its 
own tax liability to be equal to that of the control group taxpayer, and the treatment 
taxpayer would behave as if a lump sum tax would be imposed.57 The law of large 
numbers is essential not only for statistical validity, but also because revenue 
                                                 
55 For a proof, see https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/265622/sample-size-proportion-per-
control-vs-experiment-group (last visited March 1, 2018). 
56 Below, we will consider the caveat that the treatment group’s tax change might have some indirect 
effect on the control group. See infra Part I.A.4. 
57 This is not entirely a bad result. Economists generally assume that lump sum taxes are the least 
distortionary. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 
213, 217 (1982). 
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neutrality means that the tax liability of each treatment group participant depends 
on all other participants’ tax returns.58 
Calculating a single ratio for all taxpayers is not the best approach. 
Taxpayers with low levels of entertainment deductions would be especially likely 
to opt in. The ratio of taxes paid by taxpayers in the control and treatment groups 
would then be close to 1. Those with large entertainment deductions would thus opt 
out. The tax authority must calculate a different ratio for each treatment taxpayer, 
based on how placement in the control or treatment group affected taxpayers with 
similar characteristics. A simple version along these lines would be to define 
subgroups of taxpayers. A group, for example, might consist of all taxpayers from 
a particular industry with a particular level of income and entertainment deductions 
from the year prior. This group would then be subdivided into treatment and 
control, and the same ratio would be used for all taxpayers in this subgroup. 
A more sophisticated, yet still easily implementable, approach would use 
multivariate regression analysis. The government would estimate two regressions, 
one for the treatment group and one for the control group. Each would predict 
reported income after the experiment as a function of variables from past years’ tax 
returns. The precise form of the regression does not matter much for our purposes; 
a simple multiple linear regression model might work well,59 or the government 
might perform a nonlinear regression60 or even use machine learning techniques, 
such as a neural network regression61 or a decision forest.62 The government can 
thus calculate for each treatment taxpayer the ratio between the tax bill that would 
be expected if the taxpayer were in the control group divided by the expected 
unadjusted tax bill if in the treatment group. The ratio does not depend on the level 
of entertainment deductions or income claimed by the taxpayer in the treatment 
year. If the sum of liability applying this ratio does not produce precisely the 
revenue-neutral amount, then all treatment taxpayers’ liability could be multiplied 
by a constant to ensure exact revenue neutrality. 
The taxpayers would be informed of the ratio calculated at the end of the 
experiment and would receive a corresponding adjustment in liability. If the 
treatment taxpayers are entitled to a discount as a result, they would receive interest 
                                                 
58 In a relatively small experiment, the government might calculate the ratio separately for each 
treatment group taxpayer – that is, making the ratio equal to the average tax reported of all taxpayers 
in the control group divided by the average tax reported of all taxpayers in the treatment group other 
than the taxpayer affected. 
59 See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION: A PRIMER (1st ed. 1998). 
60 See generally GEORGE A.F. SEBER & C.J. WILD, NONLINEAR REGRESSION (2003). 
61 See Donald F. Specht, A General Regression Neural Network, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL 
NETWORKS 568 (1991). 
62 See Weida Tong et al., Decision Forest: Combining the Predictions of Multiple Independent 
Decision Tree Models, 43 J. CHEM. INF. COMP. SCI. 525 (2003). 
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on the money for the period the government held it.63 In a reverse experiment where 
taxpayers eventually pay more, if the taxpayers underestimated their final liability, 
they might pay interest, just as a taxpayer who is responsible for quarterly estimated 
tax payments may be required to pay interest when the quarterly payments are too 
low.64 If final reconciliation of the experiment takes a while, for example because 
some taxpayers fail to file their tax returns on time,65 the government could make 
an initial adjustment a few months after the relevant taxable year and then a final 
adjustment some time later. If finality is more important than exact revenue 
neutrality, this final adjustment could be scheduled to come sooner rather than later.  
These timing details aside, the statistical approach reduces the risk that 
because of adverse selection, those who opt into the experiment are those with 
characteristics that make them relatively immune to the tax law change at issue. 
Such taxpayers could still opt in, but if the relevant characteristics are captured by 
the model, then it would predict that these taxpayers’ liability would not change 
much, and so the effect of the experiment on these taxpayers would be small. This 
does not solve the adverse selection problem completely, however. The 
independent variables are an incomplete list of factors that might affect taxpayers, 
and taxpayers can be expected to have private information about their future 
behavior.66 A taxpayer who plans to reduce its entertainment deductions for reasons 
not apparent based on available data would be particularly likely to opt in. 
3. Evaluation of Experimental Success 
How can the government assess whether an experiment was successful? 
One question is whether the experiment led to behavioral changes among taxpayers. 
That might be discerned from tax returns filed, particularly if taxpayers in the 
control group are required to report the same data that they would have reported if 
they were in the treatment group, even if that data is no longer relevant in computing 
their tax liability. In this example, treatment group taxpayers might reduce their 
entertainment expenses. If entertainment expenses declined but gross income did 
not, then that would indicate that entertainment expenses in fact are largely not 
legitimate business expenses. More generally, the ratio of the decline in 
entertainment expenses to the decline in gross income provides a proxy for the 
success of the experiment. It is not obvious, however, what level marks the cutoff 
                                                 
63 The IRS often pays interest on overpayments. See I.R.C. § 6611. 
64 Id. § 6654.   
65 Taxpayers who file late must pay penalties. Id. § 6651. Such penalties, excluding interest, could 
be included the comparison between the treatment and control group, to account for the possibility 
that the tax regime may affect the timeliness of filing.  
66 ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012) (discussing the 
importance of asymmetric information to tax policy analysis). 
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between success and failure, particularly because what matters is the marginal 
effect of the tax reduction on gross income.67  
This possibility highlights two points: First, even when tax rules are 
conventionally framed as binary choices, they often simply reflect polar points on 
the spectrum. This is more obvious in the context of entertainment deductions than 
in many areas of tax law, because businesses have long been allowed only partial 
deduction of certain classes of entertainment expenses.68 Ideally, a process of 
experimentation might lead the government to hone in on the efficient level of 
permissible deductibility. Second, it will not always be straightforward to interpret 
an experiment to determine whether it was successful or not, even as to the 
taxpayers who opted in.69 Therefore, the strongest indication that a tax change is 
efficient as to the taxpayers in the experiment is the mere fact that the taxpayers 
opted into the experiment. So long as an experiment is revenue neutral, taxpayers’ 
willingness to opt into the experiment suggests that it is expected to leave the 
taxpayers better off, with no adverse consequences for the fisc. Continued demand 
from taxpayers to participate in subsequent iterations of the experiment would 
strengthen this inference. 
The inference, however, carries caveats. First, the experiment’s success 
may not be generalizable to taxpayers who do not opt in. This highlights the 
questions of how the government can scale up an experiment, a question to which 
we will soon return.70 Second, the efficiency of a tax experiment may depend not 
only on the effects of the tax on the taxpayers, but also the effect of the tax on third 
parties. In the context of the entertainment deduction, for example, our analysis has 
so far overlooked the clients who would have been wined and dined but no longer 
received such benefits. Any loss of utility that these clients suffer might count as a 
negative effect on social welfare. Or perhaps the effect is positive, if entertainment 
expenses represent kickbacks that distort decisions of economic agents,71 especially 
if public officials receive benefits.72 The lower the effects on third parties, the 
stronger the case that a revenue-neutral tax reform will be welfare neutral as to 
nonparticipants. 
                                                 
67 See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 931, 947 (2016) (“A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, in contrast to a taxpayer’s average tax 
rate, is an effective indicator of how the Internal Revenue Code affects a taxpayer’s decisions.”). 
68 I.R.C. 274(n) (disallowing 50% of the deduction for most meal expenses).   
69 Cf. infra Part II.A (considering generalizing experiments beyond initial participants). 
70 See infra Part II.A. 
71 See LEONARD J. BROOKS & PAUL DUNN, BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR DIRECTORS, 
EXECUTIVES & ACCOUNTANTS 388 (7th ed. 2015). 
72 A taxpayer may not deduct business expense payments made in violation of state or federal law. 
I.R.C. § 162(c)(2). 
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4. Enhancement of Experimental Interpretability 
An additional caveat is that experimental subjects may behave differently 
than they would if they faced the same tax rules but outside an experimental 
context. The problem arises in medical experiments when participants may be able 
to deduce which group they are in.73 In social experiments, it is impossible to 
conceal group assignments. Taxpayers can respond to the economic incentives of a 
tax change only if they are aware of it, so there can be no placebo group.74 
“Hawthorne effects” occur when members of the treatment group behave 
differently because they know that they are in an experiment.75 Subjects might, in 
a tax experiment, focus more on the relevant tax issue, giving it outsized 
importance. Or subjects might be regret averse;76 that is, they wish to avoid feeling 
regret for the decision that they have already made to opt into the experiment.77 In 
the entertainment deduction experiment, an exaggerated cutback on expenses 
reduces the risk that the taxpayer will find out that the taxpayer would have been 
better off with status quo law.  
Meanwhile, John Henry effects occur when subjects in the control group 
behave differently than they would outside an experiment.78 Annoyed at not being 
assigned to treatment, some might increase their entertainment expenses, so that 
they can profit by deducting even more than they would have. Or, they might cut 
back on such expenses, figuring they were planning to before being assigned to 
control. Determining which scenario is more likely is an exercise in speculative 
psychology. The premise of tax experimentation is that when taxpayers are faced 
with direct economic incentives, the treatment group’s behavioral responses are 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Jefferson M. Fish, The Trouble with Double-Blind Placebo Studies, PSYCHOL. TODAY, 
Nov. 23, 2010 (noting that patients often can determine whether a pill is a placebo or biologically 
active), available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/looking-in-the-cultural-
mirror/201011/the-trouble-double-blind-placebo-studies. 
74 Double-blind medical experiments typically include three groups: a control group, a placebo 
group, and a treatment group. See, e.g., id. 
75 See Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 452-53 (1992) 
(describing experiments in which such effects were claimed). 
76 See generally Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of 
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982) (defining and defining evidence for 
regret aversion). 
77 For example, litigants may accept settlement offers because they wish to avoid the possibility of 
regret should they do worse at trial. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion 
Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43. 
78 See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the Measurement 
of Self Esteem in Primary Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, J. ALCOHOL & 
DRUG EDUC., Spring 1991, at 87, 99 (describing an observed John Henry effect). 
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direct results of those incentives. But at least on the margins, psychological 
considerations related to the experimental setting may play a role.  
A related but distinct concern is that group assignment might affect 
taxpayers’ reporting of their behavior. Control group taxpayers might decide to be 
more honest in reporting their entertainment deductions, because they worry (even 
if falsely) that government investigators will be more likely to find fraud. Or, miffed 
at being assigned to control, such taxpayers might take shortcuts in reporting. 
Meanwhile, even if reporting is required for individuals in the treatment group and 
they face liability for misreporting,79 treated taxpayers might reason that their 
entertainment deductions no longer factor into their tax liability and thus not bother 
to collect all the underlying data. Or, they might reason that because the reported 
expense values will not reduce their liability, they might as well overreport to avoid 
any possible sanction for misreporting. 
The tax authority might adopt various approaches to addressing these 
issues. The first and often plausible is simply to ignore them. The tax authority’s 
principal job is to produce summary data to inform taxpayers, who can then make 
their own assessments of experimental results in deciding whether to opt in for 
future years. If the ultimate measure of a revenue-neutral tax experiment’s success 
is demand to receive the tax treatment, then what matters is simply that the 
government report the data accurately. If, however, the goal is to enable both the 
tax authority and the taxpayer to make informed rather than speculative decisions, 
then some other approaches may be necessary if Hawthorne or John Henry effects 
are expected to be large. The following subsections will consider other approaches 
that will make experiments either to interpret. 
a. Varying the Treatment 
An alternative strategy for reducing the magnitude of Hawthorne and John 
Henry effects is to define a range of treatment groups.80 For example, the 
experiment might feature eleven groups in all, with one receiving no deduction, one 
receiving 10% deductibility, and so forth. The group receiving the full deductibility 
allowed under current law would be the control group, and it might be larger than 
each other group.81 Hawthorne and John Henry effects seem likely to be most 
                                                 
79 Ordinarily, tax law imposes no penalty on taxpayers who fail to file but through withholdings 
have overpaid their tax, because penalties are based on the size of the deficiency. See Patronik-
Holder v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 374, 380 (1993). 
80 This is often described as a dose-response design. See WILLIAM M. HOLMES, USING PROPENSITY 
SCORES IN QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 18 (2014). 
81 See, e.g., Simon Bate & Natasha A. Karp, A Common Control Group—Optimising the Experiment 
Design to Maximize Sensitivity, 9 PLOS ONE (2014), available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4263717/ (showing that with multiple treatments, 
sensitivity for comparison with the control is maximized with a larger control group). 
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pronounced at the extremes, when a taxpayer concludes that it is in the control or 
receiving the full treatment. Some components of Hawthorne or John Henry effects 
might gradually increase with the treatment level, but this approach would at least 
isolate the components of these effects that emerge at the extremes. An 
extrapolation of the trend between 10% and 90% to the extremes might be a more 
reliable gauge for policy than the extremes themselves.  
Eleven is not a magic number. Taxpayers could be assigned to a smaller or 
larger number of groups. Revenue neutrality, however, must be retained. One 
strategy for achieving this with multiple treatment groups would be to calculate 
multipliers based on the performance of each treatment group individually, 
comparing to the single control group. But unless the number of taxpayers is very 
large, then the multiplier levels might be noisy, influenced by randomness within 
the control group or a particular treatment group. Even if the control group and a 
treatment group as a whole are representative, a particular taxpayer might be 
matched82 through regression to a relatively small number of taxpayers in the 
treatment group who had higher or lower than expected performance for reasons 
having nothing to do with the experiment.  
An alternative approach would be to develop a single integrated regression 
model that allows a taxpayer’s expected income given prior years’ data to be 
estimated based on the degree of deductibility. The regression might include a term 
representing the degree of deductibility allowed, along with a square and perhaps a 
cube of that term. The regression would also include all other variables from 
previous years’ tax data that allowed for multipliers to vary within the treatment 
group in the proposal.83 Each non-control taxpayer’s multiplier would then be 
calculated as the taxpayer’s expected tax level if full deductibility were allowed 
divided by the taxpayer’s expected unadjusted tax level given the actual level of 
deductibility allowed.  
Allowing for a wide range of treatment levels has an additional potential 
benefit beyond helping to highlight Hawthorne and John Henry effects: It may help 
identify tax changes where the optimum exists somewhere between the extremes. 
Perhaps the optimal degree of deductibility for entertainment expenses is 
somewhere between 0% and 100%, because spending money on entertainment 
generally provides some consumption value but also contributes to taxpayers’ 
income. On the other hand, if an experiment seems to suggest a result relatively 
                                                 
82 The term “matching” is often used in statistics to refer to a particular experimental design that is 
an alternative to regression, in which baseline characteristics are used to divide subjects into 
treatment-control pairs. See, e.g., Ruta Brazauskas & Brent R. Logan, Observational Studies: 
Matching or Regression?, 22 BIO. BLOOD MARROW TRANSPLANT 557 (2015). Whatever design is 
used, taxpayers will be affected by those with similar characteristics. 
83 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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near the zero-deductibility extreme, there may be a strong argument for tax law to 
move all the way to that extreme, namely that eliminating deductibility altogether 
is likely to reduce transaction costs.84 If for political or transaction costs reasons, 
the law seems likely to settle at an extreme,85 no matter the experimental results, 
then an experiment that simply compares a control group and a single treatment 
group may provide for a cleaner comparison. 
b. Two-Level Randomization 
With two-level randomization, the government first identifies taxpayers for 
whom the alternative regime might be appropriate. Then the government randomly 
selects a subset of these eligible taxpayers to be invited to opt in. Some taxpayers 
invited will decline. Of those who do opt in, some fraction must be randomly 
assigned to the control group, while others are subject to the alternative tax regime. 
Figure 1 illustrates these different groups. 
                                                 
84 For a discussion of transactions costs in the tax system, see Kneave Riggal, 17 VA. TAX REV. 295, 
307-08 (1997). 
85 The current treatment of entertainment expenses is at the extreme of complete disallowance. I.R.C. 
§ 274(a)(1). But meals with clients are 50% deductible. Id. § 274(n). 
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Figure 1. Two-Level Randomization 
 
Two-level randomization affords two levels of comparison. As before, the 
government can compare nominal tax liability from those taxpayers subject to the 
alternative regime (i.e., those shaded gray in Figure 1) to tax revenues from the 
control group. But now, the government can also compare the tax returns of those 
taxpayers who were not invited to opt in, despite being eligible, to the tax returns 
of all taxpayers who were invited to opt in. Suppose, for example, that control group 
taxpayers seek to make up for the misfortune of being placed in the control group 
by working harder. This would be unfortunate for the members of the treatment 
group, who would receive less of a tax discount than they otherwise would, making 
the experiment seem less successful than it in fact was. The larger comparison 
might identify this behavior.  
It may seem counterintuitive to make a comparison involving many 
taxpayers not participating in the experiment. One can, however, think of the 
eligible-but-invited taxpayers as serving as a control group of a sort for the 
treatment of being invited to participate in the experiment. Even if we assume that 
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being invited to participate has no direct effect on behavior,86 Hawthorne and John 
Henry effects can be seen as indirect effects of being invited into the experiment. 
Two-level randomization allows for measurement of these indirect effects, which 
are likely to be more attenuated than the effect of being chosen for the treatment 
group but less susceptible to the Hawthorne and John Henry problems.  
Two-level randomization thus might help allow better interpretation of 
experiments. But if two-level randomization is used, the results also could be used 
to calculate a second multiplier that would then be used to achieve more accurate 
revenue neutrality. A simple approach would be simply to multiply the treatment 
group’s total tax bills by a constant, applied on top of the original multiplier, to 
ensure that the average tax revenues received from those invited to the experiment 
are equal to the average tax revenues received from those eligible but not invited. 
This would assure potential participants in a tax experiment that their ultimate tax 
liability will not be affected by John Henry or Hawthorne effects arising from the 
division into treatment and control groups. Alternatively, a multiplier might apply 
to both the treatment and control group, or even to all taxpayers invited into the 
experiment. Such an application might be justified on the ground of horizontal 
equity, but it would effectively punish control group taxpayers who work harder as 
a result of John Henry effects or reward those who work less hard as a result. 
The tax adjustments to achieve revenue neutrality could be more 
sophisticated still. A separate multiple regression could model the eligible-but-
uninvited taxpayers. The government would then be able to calculate the expected 
tax liability of each member of the treatment group if that member had not been 
invited to participate. This allows for an individualized second multiplier to be 
calculated for each treatment group member. A third multiplier could then be 
applied to all treatment group participants to achieve revenue neutrality. Arguably, 
however, such adjustments may make the system too opaque. Thus, the tax 
authority reasonably might seek to achieve revenue neutrality only with the first 
layer of multipliers, even if using two-level randomization. At least, that might 
make sense in early experimentation on experimentation. If large discrepancies 
between eligible-but-uninvited taxpayers and invited taxpayers emerged, then such 
refinements might be necessary.  
c. Intent-to-Treat Randomization 
Yet another approach would be for the government to conduct just a single 
layer of randomization, but for that layer of randomization to be at the invitation 
                                                 
86 If the experiment is well-known even among those not invited, the nonreceipt of an invitation 
might affect behavior. This can produce a sort of John Henry effect of its own. See supra note 78 
and accompanying text. But these effects seem likely to be smaller than the effects on those who 
have taken the affirmative step of trying to opt in. 
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stage. The tax authority would invite only some eligible taxpayers to participate but 
then allow all taxpayers who volunteer for the experiment to receive the alternative 
tax regime. This approach is appropriate if there is relatively little reason to worry 
that merely being offered or denied the alternative regime will change taxpayer 
behavior. The approach may be useful if it is seen as undesirable to randomly pick 
a taxpayer to participate in an experiment but then assign the taxpayer to the control 
group. A standard statistical methodology called “intent to treat” can be used to 
determine the statistical significance of the results, comparing results of those 
offered the treatment (eligible and invited taxpayers) with those not offered it 
(eligible but not invited), taking into account that many may decline the treatment.87 
Revenue neutrality could then be achieved with a simple multiplier applied to all 
invited and opting-in taxpayers, set at a level ensuring that revenues are equal 
among invited and not-invited taxpayers. 
B. Other Revenue-Neutral Tax Experiments 
1. Deductions 
a. Disallowing Other Deductions 
The deduction for entertainment expenses has served as a useful example 
of what could have been an alternative to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act because the 
Act eliminated the deduction, while lowering rates. It is useful in part because it is 
relatively trivial and uncontroversial, allowing us to focus on the merits of revenue-
neutral experimentation rather than the merits of the entertainment deduction itself. 
Yet revenue-neutral experimentation also could have been used to assess the impact 
of eliminating other deductions. For example, the tax reform reduced the 
availability of the business interest deduction.88 A justification for this reform is 
that the tax law previously advantaged equity relative to debt, because equity is 
taxed twice.89 President Obama proposed to eliminate the deduction in part because 
it increases leverage in the economy as a whole,90 making it “more susceptible to 
                                                 
87 See Vikrant K. Bubbar & Hans J. Kreder, The Intention-to-Treat Principle: A Primer, 88 J. BONE 
& JOINT SURG. 2097 (2006).  
88 See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13301 (amending I.R.C. § 163(j)). 
89 See, e.g., CURTIS DUBAT, TAXATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 
(Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/taxation-debt-and-equity-
setting-the-record-straight. 
90 THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 8-9 (2016), available 
at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-
for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf. 
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severe downturns.”91 Others have argued that it would be better to eliminate the 
double taxation of equity,92 or to allow a deduction based on a corporation’s 
combined debt and equity.93 Meanwhile, there is a strong theoretical argument that 
business interest should be deductible.94 A tax experiment might have assessed one 
or more possible reforms. High demand to participate in such an experiment would 
suggest a view that the current approach to business interest imposes significant 
distortions. Meanwhile, the government or third parties could study how different 
tax treatment affects decisions about whether to finance with debt or equity. 
Another possible subject for experimentation before enactment would have 
been one of the most controversial changes95 in the statute, the imposition of caps 
on the deductibility of state and local taxes.96 Many commentators have claimed 
that these caps represented a purely political calculation, as the states most 
adversely affected by this change were those with high taxes, and such states are 
generally “blue states” that lean Democratic rather than Republican.97 This 
highlights that tax policy has distributional consequences, not just efficiency 
consequences. Yet some argue that these deductions may cause states and localities 
to oversupply goods that might be more optimally supplied by the market;98 
eliminating the tax allows taxpayers to be taxed on the consumption benefits that 
they receive.99 There exist counterarguments100 and compromise proposals.101 A 
revenue-neutral tax experiment on individual taxpayers could not allow full 
examination of these issues, because such an experiment could not establish how 
the existence of the deduction affects state and local policy. But it might highlight 
                                                 
91 Id. at 9. 
92 See DUBAT, supra note 89 (arguing that this should be preferred to eliminating the deduction) 
93 Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055 
(2000). 
94 See, e.g., Charles O. Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest: An Exercise in Planned 
Confusion, 41 TAX LAW. 803, 803 (1988) (explaining the logic both for an income tax base and for 
a consumption tax base).  
95 A poll indicated that 75% of voters believed that such taxes should remain deductible. See 
Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Oppose GOP Tax-Reform Bill, HILL, Nov. 16, 2017, available at 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/360693-poll-majority-oppose-gop-tax-reform-bill. 
96 Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042 (amending I.R.C. § 164). 
97 See, e.g., Alicia Parlapiano & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Among the Tax Bill’s Biggest Losers: High-
Income, Blue State Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/05/us/politics/tax-bill-salt.html. 
98 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under 
the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1996). 
99 See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Manadates, and 
the “SALT” Deduction, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 805, 813 (2008). 
100 Kaplow, supra note 98, at 486 (noting that the deduction may promote spending on undersupplied 
public goods). 
101 See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX REV. 327 
(2016) (arguing for the deductibility of state but not local taxes). 
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whether taxpayers believe that the deduction distorts their own behavior, for 
example by leading them to locate in areas with higher taxes.  
b. Allowing New Deductions 
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test the efficiency of 
new deductions. A tax experiment, for example, could be used to test the possibility 
of reintroducing the entertainment expenses deduction. A taxpayer might believe 
that the new tax regime is inefficient, causing the taxpayer to spend too little on 
entertainment relative to other ways of recruiting clients. Such a taxpayer should 
be willing to opt into an experiment in which the treatment group would receive the 
deduction. The taxpayer would then be subject to a multiplier that would increase 
nominal tax liability to ensure revenue neutrality. Thus, the participation carrot and 
stick are reversed, but the experiment can be run as before. Similarly, experiments 
could test reducing the limits on the business interest deduction and the state and 
local tax deduction; such experiments could be executed simultaneously with 
experiments on increasing the limits on such deductions.  
Meanwhile, experiments could test the possibility of new deductions, such 
as a commuting deduction, perhaps limited to the cost of commuting from a 
workplace to the nearest location with a supply of affordable housing.102 More 
ambitiously, an experiment might test a deduction for child care, perhaps limited to 
married taxpayers who both have full time jobs. The current lack of deductibility 
may lead parents (particularly mothers) not to re-enter the work force, even though 
they would do so in the absence of tax distortions.103 A married couple might opt 
into such an experiment because they anticipate that many in the control group will 
not return to the work force. Couples in the treatment group might return to the 
work force in greater numbers, paying the same level of taxes as the control group 
on average but less than if they returned to the work force in the absence of the 
experiment. 
2. Income 
a. Imputing Income 
An alternative policy that might cure the same alleged inefficiency would 
be to test imputing income to stay-at-home parents.104 The theory is that a parent 
                                                 
102 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
103 See, e.g., Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 
GEO. L.J. 1323, 1350-61 (2017) (proposing to allow deductibility). 
104 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618-36 (1996) (arguing for 
imputing income from household labor). 
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who works at home in effect is paying herself to take a job, but her income from 
doing so is not taxed. Economists sometimes argue that imputed income should be 
taxable,105 but taxing imputed income seems politically infeasible. Even so, parents 
might be willing to opt into an experiment in which time spent on childrearing, 
perhaps just during work hours but perhaps more broadly, is taxed. Tax experiments 
are not limited to questions of what count as deductions, and taxpayers might 
volunteer to accept a greater tax base (leading to greater taxable income) in 
exchange for lower tax rates (because of revenue neutrality). This experiment might 
interest similar taxpayers as an experiment on a child care deduction, but there 
could be some differences. Taxpayers who do not expect to be able to itemize 
deductions, for example, might still be interested in an imputed income 
experiment.106 Taxpayers with older children who can be left alone might prefer 
this experiment as well.107  
An argument against an imputed income experiment is that there is little 
reason to conduct an experiment on a tax policy that ultimately will be politically 
infeasible. On the other hand, perhaps experimentation might lead imputing income 
to become more palatable, particularly in combination with other policies lowering 
tax rates for parents. Even if this experiment is impractical, other imputed income 
experiments might be feasible. The second greatest category of tax expenditure as 
calculated by the Treasury arises from the lack of imputed income for rent from 
owners of housing who live in their homes.108 A tax experiment might seek to move 
tax to the “baseline tax system,”109 by imputing income for rent and then allowing 
“a deduction for expenses, such as interest, depreciation, property taxes, and other 
costs, associated with earning such rental income.”110 Such an experiment might 
help eliminate distortions leading to excessive owner-occupied housing.111 In 
principle, similar experiments could test other forms of imputed income.112  
                                                 
105 See, e.g., Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 115-16 & n.45 (2009) 
(discussing imputed income and citing sources). 
106 Taxpayers who would be below the standard deduction even with child care expenses would not 
benefit from deductibility. See I.R.C. § 63(c) (providing for a standard deduction). 
107 This highlights that tax policies may have externalities. See infra Part II.D. Imputing income for 
child care might result in parents leaving their children alone more often, for better or more likely 
for worse. 
108 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX EXPENDITURES 22 tbl. 1 (2017) 
109 Id. at 9 (arguing that imputed income is taxed in the baseline). 
110 Id. at 10. 
111 This thus implicates some of the same externality issues as the home mortgage interest deduction. 
See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text. 
112 There is, however, likely some limit, even if political feasibility is placed to the side. John Brooks 
asks, “If I am earning imputed rent from my home, what about from my car? My furniture? My 
computer? My dishwasher? My dishes?” John W. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 TAX L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4). 
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b. Taxing Work Amenities 
Beyond the question of imputed income, experiments on definition of 
income can explore fundamental questions about whether the classic Haig113-
Simons114 model is appropriate or can test small deviations from the Haig-Simons 
model. John Brooks critiques Henry Simon’s argument that “psychic benefits” in 
income can be ignored because all workers are equally affected.115 Brooks points 
out that “[t]here is enough heterogeneity of psychic benefits across jobs and 
individuals to make universal assumptions unreasonable.”116 In theory, a tax 
authority might conduct a survey to rate the attractiveness of different jobs and 
impose corresponding tax increase on relatively pleasant and cushy jobs—or, 
equivalently given revenue neutrality, a tax decrease for unpleasant jobs. Taxpayers 
might be willing to opt into such an experiment if, more than most such taxpayers, 
they are willing to switch to a less pleasant job. A much more modest experiment 
aimed at the same theoretical point might seek to tax amenities at work, ranging 
from free meals117 to employee gyms.118 
c. Changing Recognition Timing 
Tax experiments also might apply to issues of timing. Some tax scholars 
have advocated switching to a system in which investments could be marked-to-
market, meaning that taxpayers would recognize gains and losses each year even if 
they do not sell the securities.119 A tax experiment might help evaluate some of the 
criticisms of a marked-to-market system, such as that it imposes substantial 
transactions costs,120 especially if the regime applies beyond publicly held securities 
                                                 
113 Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray 
Haig ed., 1921) (“Income is the money value of the net accretion to one’s economic power between 
two points of time.”). 
114 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM 
OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (defining income as “the result obtained by adding consumption during 
the period to ‘wealth’ at the end of the period and then subtracting ‘wealth’ at the beginning”). 
115 Brooks, supra note 112, at 13 (citing Simons, supra note 114, at 53).  
116 Id.  
117 Meals are excluded from income if “furnished on the business premises of the employer” and 
“for the convenience of the employer.” I.R.C. § 119(a). 
118 “Gross income does not include the value of any on-premises athletic facility provided by an 
employer to its employees.” Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e) (1989). 
119 Currently mark-to-market is normally available solely for securities dealers like stock 
brokerages. I.R.C. § 475; cf. id. § 1256 (providing mark-to-market on sophisticated financial 
instruments like futures contracts and foreign currency contracts).  
120 See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the 
Virtue of Attainable Virtues,  
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to assets such as art.121 A significant complication with a tax experiment of this sort 
is that the tax experiment must occur over a relatively long time horizon. We will 
return to this issue, along to the related danger that participants in tax experiments 
may seek to shift income into or out of the experimental period, below.122  
3. Tax Procedure 
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test procedural 
changes. For example, an experiment might test a regime in which the government 
would agree to provide binding opinions on tax questions by phone or email. 
Because taxpayers might then take advantage of mistaken statements of tax law by 
tax authority employees,123 the treatment group would likely pay lower taxes than 
the control group, leading to an ex post multiplier increasing tax rates. Ideally, the 
ex post adjustment should also compensate for the extra expenses borne by the tax 
authority in providing extra customer service to the treatment taxpayers.  
Experiments could also test taxpayer-adverse procedural changes. For 
example, some taxpayers with relatively complex returns (say, taxpayers with 
foreign bank accounts) might opt into a regime in which those taxpayers agree to 
submit with their tax returns a report submitted by a privately selected auditor. Such 
taxpayers presumably would be less likely to engage in tax evasion. But in 
expectation, they would pay no higher taxes than before, since the multiplier would 
be less than one. Such an experiment could provide valuable information to the tax 
authority. If the control group taxpayers reported much less in nominal taxes before 
application of the multiplier, that would indicate a high degree of tax avoidance and 
a high degree of effectiveness of a private audit requirement. If, on the other hand, 
differences were small, incorporating the program into the baseline tax regime 
would generate little revenue.  
4. Radical Tax Reform 
Revenue-neutral tax experimentation can be used not only to assess 
relatively minor changes in deductions, but also plausibly significant differences in 
policy. For example, scholars have proposed abolishing the corporate tax—which 
                                                 
121 Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolutionary” 
Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 801-02 (1992) (discussing applicable rules for art 
objects). 
122 See infra Part II.C.2. 
123 Currently, when a taxpayer calling the IRS gets an answer from an IRS employee, the taxpayer 
has no legal entitlement to rely on that answer. Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on IRS 
Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421, 431–37. 
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historically took an average of 27% of each company’s profits124—and instead 
granting the government a roughly equivalent claim on the corporation’s equity. 
Thus, the government might receive 27% of a corporation’s stock.125 This reform 
promises significant efficiency gains, as tax-minimization goals would no longer 
distort decisions, and because corporations would no longer need legions of well-
paid tax advisors.126  
It might seem that this is not amenable to a revenue-neutral tax experiment. 
If the government receives equity, there is no way to ensure that the equity that the 
corporation contributes will produce equal revenue over time. But a change in the 
experimental design could enable the reform proposal to be tested. The government 
could auction rights to some percentage of the tax revenue that it will receive from 
both the treatment group and the control group. The government might then adjust 
the ownership percentage that the government takes until both revenue streams sell 
to the market for the same price. For example, the government might initially offer 
27%, but then increase this if it was unable to find a sufficient number of purchasers 
of the revenue stream at that price. As the government changes the ownership 
percentage, some corporate taxpayers might change their mind about whether to 
participate in the experiment. But ultimately, the government should be able to 
identify an ownership percentage that is revenue neutral in expectation. 
That does not mean that every radical tax reform is amenable to tax 
experimentation. It seems unlikely, for example, that a value added tax could be 
implemented on an experimental basis.127 A value-added tax requires each producer 
to pay tax on the value it adds; so, for example, a producer purchasing a product for 
$100 and selling it for $150 would pay tax only on the $50 difference.128 If enacted 
economy-wide, then a combination of taxpayers in the value chain pay tax on all of 
the $150. If only some producers were required to pay tax, the system could become 
much more complex. Value-added taxes already create challenges of international 
harmonization,129 but this would magnify those challenges on a domestic level. 
                                                 
124 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R17413, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX RATE 
COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (Jan. 6, 2014).  
125 Dean Baker, Get Rid of Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2016, at A21 (providing additional 
details of this proposal, including that the shares should be nontransferrable); cf. Mihir A. Desai et 
al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592 (2007) (“The state, thanks to its tax claim on cash 
flows, is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all corporations.”).  
126 Baker, supra note 125. 
127 Consumption taxes that are administered in much the same way as income taxes, rather than like 
sales taxes, could be a subject of experimentation. See generally David F. Bradford, The X-Tax in 
the World Economy (NBER Working Paper No. W10676, 2004) (describing such an approach to 
taxation). 
128 For a discussion of different ways of calculating the tax, see Itai Grinberg, Where Credit Is Due: 
Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for a Partial Replacement VAT, 63 TAX L. REV. 309 
(2010). 
129 See, e.g., id. at 321-22 (discussing some international issues). 
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II. CHALLENGES FOR TAX EXPERIMENTATION 
This Part addresses challenges for tax experimentation. Part II.A discusses 
how the government can determine whether to scale up an experiment or transition 
to a later stage of experimentation, such as an opt-out or involuntary experiment, 
prior to enactment as general law. Part II.B addresses equity objections to tax 
experimentation, considering both horizontal equity and after-tax income 
inequality. Part II.C assesses whether taxpayers might be able to manipulate tax 
experimentation to their advantage, and Part II.D explores whether tax experiments 
can work with tax expenditures without adversely affecting other tax policy goals. 
A. Transitions 
1. Increased Scope 
The goal of tax experimentation is to provide information that can change 
baseline tax policy. Although appropriate experimental design can improve 
policymakers’ ability to judge whether an experiment is a success,130 the most easily 
accessible benchmark of success is simply participation. Given the constraint of 
revenue neutrality, taxpayer demand to be in the experiment suggests that the tax 
change is Pareto-improving, at least so long as the tax change does not induce 
behaviors that have effects on third parties.131 But that leaves unclear whether the 
experiment would benefit others. Perhaps other taxpayers who might benefit from 
the experiment have not signed up simply because they did not know about it. But 
they may have chosen not to enroll because they expect that they would do less well 
under the experimental conditions. 
Thus, a first step in transitioning from experiment to a tax law change is to 
invite more taxpayers to receive the treatment. If in initial rounds only some 
taxpayers were invited to participate in the experiment, then more might be allowed 
to participate, still assigning the same proportion of enrollees to treatment and 
control as before. With two-level randomization,132 for example, a higher 
proportion of eligible taxpayers might be invited to participate. Alternatively or as 
a supplement, a higher percentage of opt-ins might be selected for the treatment 
group. Indeed, if an experiment continues to be successful, it is possible that all 
taxpayers who wish to opt-in might ultimately be assigned to the treatment group.  
At this point, the experiment ceases to be an experiment. Rather, it can be 
seen as tax reform in and of itself, though of a different form from what one might 
                                                 
130 See supra Part I.A.4. 
131 The possibility of externalities is addressed infra Part II.D. 
132 See supra Part I.A.4.b. 
  TAX EXPERIMENTATION  32 
 
 
expect. The tax reform amounts to giving taxpayers the option to elect a particular 
tax regime in the subsequent year, in combination with a tax rate change. Tax law 
already allows taxpayers to elect various options.133 If the change is still to aim at 
revenue neutrality, then, as in the experiment itself, different taxpayers should 
receive different rate reductions based on data from past tax returns. Without a 
control group, it will be impossible to do this precisely, though the government 
might approximate this by using data from when a control group still existed. 
Making the treatment generally available will not likely reduce government 
revenues, as those who did not opt in to the experiment in the past will tend to be 
those who benefit less from the experimental treatment. 
There may, however, be a strong reason not to allow all taxpayers into the 
treatment group, even if all taxpayers (or at least all taxpayers who know about the 
program and might plausibly be affected by it) would choose to opt in. Once an 
alternative tax regime has expanded to be available as an option to all taxpayers 
meeting specified criteria, then it becomes impossible to run an experiment 
confirming that the alternative regime continues to produce at least as much tax 
revenue as the generally applicable tax law.  The same problem applies with 
medical trials:  once a drug is generally available, there must be “clinical equipoise” 
if the drug is to be tested against placebo.134 Thus, the case for maintaining a control 
group is similar to the case for revenue-neutral tax experimentation generally. Even 
if only a few taxpayers wind up in the control group, this allows for continued study 
of the tax rule, which may be especially important if the efficiency of the rule 
changes over time. This is especially true with revenue-neutral experimentation, 
since the control group serves a critical role in allowing the tax rate to vary across 
treatment group taxpayers. 
2. Opt-Out Experiments 
A voluntary tax experiment can either be opt-in, where a taxpayer who takes 
no action remains subject to generally applicable tax law, or opt-out, where a 
taxpayer will be subject to the alternative tax regime without affirmatively taking a 
step to elect generally applicable law.  So far, we have assumed that all tax 
experiments would be opt in. This approach fits better into the landscape of typical 
randomized governmental experiments.135 Such experimentation is generally rare, 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 451(c)(2) (allowing taxpayers to elect a particular approach to advance 
payments). 
134 See Miller & Brody, supra note 26; see also Alex John London et al., Rethinking Research Ethics: 
The Case of Postmarketing Trials, 336 SCIENCE 544 (2012) (discussing ethical issues in 
postapproval studies). 
135 See Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary to ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 1, 1 (1975) (discussing a wide range of experiments). 
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but when the government has engaged in it, usually there is some benefit (e.g., a 
welfare program,136 a child’s eligibility for a school voucher program137) that the 
government makes available to volunteers (i.e., those who opt in). Randomization 
thus has the dual benefit of allocating a scarce resource and providing the 
government with better information. Moreover, such experiments help ensure that 
experimentation is Pareto-optimal, since properly informed taxpayers will opt into 
an alternative tax regime only if they expect it to increase their utility. 
In an opt-in experiment, the government should provide a meaningful 
disclosure to invited taxpayers. At least, such a disclosure should explain that 
assignment to the treatment group will change the taxpayer’s baseline tax liability, 
but that later adjustments will ensure that treatment taxpayers on average pay on 
average the same amount of taxes as those in the control group. The disclosure 
should also indicate how long the taxpayer will be subject to the treatment regime. 
We have assumed that experiments would be for one year only, but taxpayers could 
be placed into a treatment group for longer, particularly if the relevant tax 
provisions affect behavior with long-lasting tax consequences, such as purchasing 
depreciable assets.138 
Such disclosures could also be used in opt-out experiments, and indeed may 
be more important given that participation is the default. A transition from an opt-
in to an opt-out experiment allows for an intermediate step, less drastic than 
permanent experimental adoption. Behavioral economics teaches that there may be 
large differences in responses depending on whether an experiment is opt-in or opt-
out.139 Thus, a change in an experiment from opt-in to opt-out is a plausible strategy 
for expanding the scope of an experiment, including far larger numbers of taxpayers 
and reducing the risk that any beneficial experimental outcomes are due to selection 
effects. The principal drawback is that opt-out creates the risk that many taxpayers 
who would not wish to participate will be enrolled because of inertia or because 
they ignored any information that they received about the experiment. Opt-out thus 
does less to ensure that the alternative tax regime increases expected taxpayer 
utility.  
                                                 
136 See, e.g., KERSHAW & FAIR, supra note 16. 
137 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson et al., School Vouchers: Results from Randomized Experiments, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2003). 
138 I.R.C. § 167 (allowing depreciation deductions for assets held for business or investment 
purposes); I.R.C. § 168 (providing method for calculating depreciation deductions for tangible 
property, typically over multiple years, even decades).    
139 See William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 375, 375-
76 (2009) (noting the distinction in result between requiring opt-out to offering opt-in). See 
generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) (discussing the status quo bias); William Samuelson & 
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) 
(same).  
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Nonetheless, an opt-out experiment remains less coercive than an actual 
change in the law. If the tax change being experimented with is a plausible 
candidate for ultimate adoption into the tax code, then an opt-out experiment is a 
modest step. Moreover, revenue neutrality may make opt-out experimentation less 
problematic than it would be with some other experiments. Revenue neutrality does 
not mean that a taxpayer should be indifferent as to which group the taxpayer is 
assigner; after all, a primary justification for revenue-neutral experimentation is 
that even revenue-neutral tax changes can benefit taxpayers. But revenue neutrality 
is a significant constraint on tax experiments. Members of the treatment group will 
be harmed only if the tax experiment in fact turns out to provide less efficient 
incentives to those in the group. The tax authority presumably will choose 
experiments that it believes have a substantial chance of producing some benefit, 
so it taxpayers who fail to consider the merits of the experiment will likely not be 
harmed by being in the treatment group. 
3. Involuntary Experimentation 
Revenue neutrality also makes an involuntary tax experiment more 
plausible than involuntary social experiments ordinarily would be. At the least, 
involuntary experimentation is a useful step after an opt-out experiment before a 
tax law change is adopted for all taxpayers. If the experiment is to continue at this 
stage, presumably the tax authority has concluded at least tentatively that the tax 
change is beneficial. Thus, it seems likely that those placed in the treatment group 
benefit relative to those in the control group. The virtue of an involuntary 
experiment is that it eliminates concerns about selection effects, virtually ensuring 
that any difference discerned between the treatment and control groups would apply 
if the tax law change were made universal. 
Some taxpayers who might not opt in to an opt-in experiment or who might 
opt out of an opt-out experiment nonetheless might be happy to be included in an 
involuntary experiment. This would not be true with most social experiments but is 
a result of revenue neutrality. A taxpayer might believe that a revenue-neutral 
elimination of the entertainment deduction would be efficient as applied to its 
activities, but the taxpayer still might worry that the other taxpayers willing to 
participate in a voluntary experiment are those who expect their entertainment 
expenses to fall for largely exogenous reasons. This adverse selection is no longer 
a concern with involuntary experimentation.  
The argument for involuntary experimentation is thus akin to an argument 
for mandatory purchases of insurance. Coverage requirements exist in part for this 
reason in the automobile insurance market,140 and individuals are required to obtain 
                                                 
140 See Understanding Minimum Car Insurance Requirements, 
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health insurance under the Affordable Care Act for this reason.141 In the health 
insurance context, the worry is that relatively healthy good risks will decide not to 
buy health insurance,142 making the market less attractive for slightly-less-good 
risks and potentially leading to a “death spiral” in which no one buys insurance,143 
even though many would like insurance at actuarially fair rates. In this context, a 
death spiral would be an experiment in which no one participates, even though 
many would participate absent adverse selection. In principle, this prospect can 
provide a normative case for involuntary experimentation even as the first step of 
an experiment, though that might be politically untenable.  
In the insurance context, however, a coverage requirement is equitable; all 
drivers must purchase coverage, not half of drivers chosen at random. Whether 
experiments are opt-in, opt-out, or mandatory, the prospect of horizontal inequity 
is likely to be the most significant obstacle to tax experimentation. We thus turn to 
that concern. 
B. Equity 
1. Horizontal Equity 
a. The Case for Randomness 
Horizontal equity is an often-cited tax policy, the gist of which is that people 
with the same income should pay the same amount of tax.144 The concern that tax 
experimentation might violate horizontal equity reflects the more general argument 
that randomization of government policy is inherently unequal.145 If the government 
randomizes taxpayers who have opted-into an alternative tax regime into a control 
                                                 
https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-minimum-car-insurance-requirements-2645473 (last 
visited March 1, 2018) (noting that 47 states require automobile insurance) 
141 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act eliminated the tax for noncompliance by setting the penalty to $0. 
See Pub. L. 115-97 § 11081 (amending I.R.C. § 5000A). 
142 This concern is listed as a legislative finding in the Affordable Care Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(I) 
(“[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until 
they needed care.”). 
143 For an argument that the risk is exaggerated, see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1254-58 (2004). 
144 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND 
GIFTS ¶ 3.1.4 (1999 & Supp. 2017); cf. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure of 
Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (“[T]here is virtual unanimity that 
horizontal equality—the extent to which equals are treated equally—is a worthy goal of any tax 
system.”) 
145 For a counterargument, see Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2009) (arguing that randomization can be consistent with equality). 
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group, subject to the generally applicable law, then the control-group taxpayers are 
arguably being treated inequitably.  Similarly, with two-level randomization, 
taxpayers who are eligible for an alternative tax regime, but who are not invited to 
opt in, are arguably being treated inequitably compared to those invited.146   
The general consensus in the literature has been that experimentation is 
acceptable if there is a sufficient justification for the difference in treatment.147 
Involuntary experimentation is most common in contexts in which individuals are 
thought to have lost their rights as a result of committing crimes.148 In one notable 
criminal justice experiment, domestic violence perpetrators in the Bronx were 
randomly assigned to one of four different treatment programs.149 That experiment 
concluded that treatment programs commonly employed throughout the nation for 
batterers may not be effective.150 An experiment giving individuals who had not 
been convicted of domestic violence incentives to enroll in various programs might 
well seem inequitable. 
The most common justification for randomization in government 
experiments is scarcity.151 For example, experiments on supplements to the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC)152 have given the benefits to only some eager to 
participate. 153 Because the government expects to lose money on each member of 
the treatment group, revenue constraints limit the number of people included. 
                                                 
146 See supra Part I.A.4.b. 
147 See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 9; Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact 
Studies in the Administration of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 13, 16. 
148 See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: 
One-Year Results from a Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 337, 343 (2002) (assigning 
offenders either to a drug court or to standard criminal process). 
149 MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
BATTERER PROGRAMS AND JUDICIAL MONITORING: RESULTS FROM A RANDOMIZED TRIAL AT THE 
BRONX MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT, at v–vi (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/battererprogramseffectiveness.pdf.  
150 Id. at ix (“Regrettably, our study suggests that some of the most prevalent court responses to 
domestic violence crime may be ineffective.”).  
151 See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 
225 (2003) (stating that randomization “usually became more acceptable” when officials 
“recognized that they did not have sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and, hence, that 
some mechanism was needed to determine who would be denied services”). 
152 I.R.C. § 32. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 37.1 (discussing the EITC in 
detail). 
153 An experiment called “Paycheck Plus” on supplementing the EITC for single workers without 
children, for whom the EITC is very limited, has been ongoing in New York City and Atlanta, 
Georgia. See Rachel Pardoe & Dan Bloom, Paycheck Plus: A New Antipoverty Strategy for Single 
Adults, MDRC POL’Y BRIEF (May 2014), http://www.mdrc.org/publication/paycheck-plus/file-full. 
This program involves both treatment groups (receiving the extra EITC) and control groups (who 
do not). Id. at 4. 
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Revenue neutrality might seem to weaken the scarcity justification for a tax 
experiment, as neither group costs the government more than the other. For revenue 
neutrality to work, however, there must be a control group, so that multipliers can 
be calculated. Membership in the treatment group is thus inherently scarce. 
A scarcity argument is much more difficult to make in the context of 
involuntary experimentation. With a mandatory experiment, taxpayers forced into 
the treatment group who may be treated inequitably. But this is just a question of 
baselines. One could frame the treatment group as embodying new legal policy, 
subject to confirmation of the experiment’s success. Then, membership in the 
control group is scarce, and so treatment group members are not being treated 
inequitably. The groups are being treated differently, but only because membership 
in each group must be scarce for an experiment to proceed. 
These arguments for scarcity may seem artificial, because the desired form 
of taxation, whether it is the treatment or the control, could at least in principle be 
given to all taxpayers, just not in the form of an experiment. But that is true with 
all social experimentation. Indeed, even with medical experimentation, scarcity is 
artificial. Presumably, all patients prefer the treatment, but we insist that they take 
some risk of being placed in the control group because we are not sure that the 
treatment is better than placebo.154 The baseline in which the patients do not have 
access to the treatment is purely a result of law, both in the medical context and in 
the tax context. 
The ultimate justification for experimentation in both contexts is 
informational.155 As with medical experiments, the justifiability of a social 
experiment depends on an evaluation of whether the treatment has a significant 
chance of being beneficial and of whether the experiment may succeed in producing 
useful information. One might argue that tax experimentation is more troubling 
than other legal experiments because horizontal equity is an important tax-law 
goal.156 On this argument, it might be acceptable to have random experiments 
concerning patent policy,157 whose primary goal is to maximize economic 
efficiency,158 but less acceptable to allow inequalities to creep into tax policy. Some 
tax scholars, however, have criticized horizontal equity as a meaningless concept.159 
                                                 
154 See Miller & Brody, supra note 26. 
155 Abramowicz et al., supra note 147, at 965 (arguing that “random policy experimentation . . . will 
produce better information than nonrandomized experiments”).  
156 See supra note 144.  
157 See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 13. 
158 Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 (2010) (describing 
the “reward” of exclusive patent rights as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent law” that 
“largely motivates current patent doctrine”).  
159 See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 621 (1993) (arguing that horizontal equity lacks 
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Indeed, economist Richard Musgrave argued that the only purpose of horizontal 
equity was as a “safeguard against capricious discrimination — a safeguard which 
might be provided equally well by a requirement that taxes be distributed at 
random.”160  
Tax law has long used randomization. For example, the IRS uses 
randomization in selecting which taxpayers’ returns to audit.161 Experimentation 
involving randomization would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Tax 
classifications are subjected to rational basis review, meaning they will be upheld 
if “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government interest.162 Increasing taxpayer 
utility while maintaining at least the same tax revenue is a legitimate government 
interest,163 and randomization allows the government to pursue these interests. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the government has particularly 
broad constitutional latitude with tax law.164 
b. Ex Ante Insurance to Avoid Inequity 
If the horizontal inequity of tax experimentation is still thought to present a 
powerful objection, the government might seek to reduce the inequity. Allowing 
treatment group taxpayers to choose to be in the control group or vice-versa would 
                                                 
“independent normative content, and that content must be supplied by reference to economic 
assumptions and a theory of justice”); accord James R. Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity 
Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012). 
160 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959).  
161 The IRS has three basic methods for selecting taxpayers to audit, two of which involve 
randomization. First, some taxpayers’ returns have features that virtually always merit audit, such 
as clearly missing income. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.5.1.11. Such audits are not 
random. Second, the IRS has a highly confidential statistical methodology called the Discriminant 
Index Function (DIF) that scores the likelihood of an audit that increases tax revenue; the higher the 
DIF score, the greater the probability of being audited. Id. § 4.1.3.2. Third, pursuant to the IRS’s 
National Research Program (NRP), some taxpayers are selected entirely at random. Id. § 4.22.1.5(5) 
(“As randomly selected returns, NRP taxpayers can represent thousands of similar taxpayers in the 
population.”). See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited 
Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 164–68 (2008) (discussing these three categories).  
162 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Apache Bend Apartments, 
Ltd. v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556, 1567 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on standing grounds, 987 F.2d 
1174 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079 (2012); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).  
163 Colangelo v. United States, 575 F.2d 994, 998 (1st Cir. 1978) (maintaining tax collections is a 
legitimate government interest).  
164 Regan, 461 U.S. at 547 (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications 
and distinctions in tax statutes.”) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1940)); 
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (“[W]e have repeatedly pointed 
out that [l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in 
tax statutes.”) (citations omitted). 
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defeat the purpose of the experiment. But the government could seek to make it so 
that taxpayers will ex ante be indifferent to which group the taxpayer is assigned.  
The government might do this by offering taxpayers randomization 
insurance. Suppose, for example, that equal numbers of participants (whether opt-
ins, non-opt-outs, or conscripts) are to be assigned to treatment and control. The 
government could allow any taxpayer to pay $1,000 to purchase a unit of insurance 
that would pay $2,000 if the taxpayer is assigned to the group that the taxpayer 
prefers less. For example, a taxpayer who would like the treatment might purchase 
for $10,000 insurance that would pay $20,000 if the taxpayer ended up assigned to 
the control group. A risk-averse taxpayer should purchase enough insurance on the 
initially less-favored option to make the taxpayer indifferent between the options.165  
Because assignment to a group is a product of pure chance, there is no 
danger of adverse selection with such insurance. An insurance payout is a lump 
sum, rather than an entitlement to be taxed according to the other tax regime, so 
there is also little danger that the insurance program will change the insureds’ 
behavior. Meanwhile, the program could be inexpensive to administer, with 
insurance payments and payouts calculated on tax returns. For the government, 
which is effectively risk neutral, to offer actuarially fair insurance has no expected 
budget impact. Private parties could also offer such insurance, but the product is so 
simple and so connected to the government program of experimentation that it is 
likely easier for the government to offer the product directly. Actuarially fair 
government insurance should be more popular than insurance in which much of the 
insurance premium covers insurance company functions like rating and 
underwriting. 
2. After-Tax Income Inequality 
The above analysis suggests that the intuition that tax experimentation 
entails serious horizontal inequities is weak. Nonetheless, one might worry about 
vertical inequities. Tax experimentation’s benefits may primarily flow to higher-
income taxpayers, worsening after-tax income inequality, if tax experimentation is 
opt in.166 This may happen for several reasons. First, higher-income taxpayers have 
                                                 
165 Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 569, 601 (1984) (“If an individual is averse to risk and actuarially fair insurance can 
be purchased (from a risk-neutral third party insurer), then it is not difficult to show that the 
individual will completely insure against the risk.”). 
166 This concern about worsening inequality is related to but not the same as “vertical equity.” 
Vertical equity is the idea that there should be an “appropriate” pattern of differentiation between 
those of different levels of economic income. McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 159, at 607; see also 
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 140–
41 (1989). “The vertical equity principle,” however, “does not prescribe whether tax rates should be 
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better tax advisors or more tax savvy (or both). They will thus be more likely to opt 
into alternative tax regimes that they expect to benefit them. Second, higher-income 
taxpayers may be subject to more complicated tax rules,167 thus creating more 
opportunities for alternative tax regimes that benefit them. Third, wealthier 
taxpayers tend to be less risk-averse.168 Even if the alternative regime appears ex 
ante to offer a better expected outcome for the taxpayer, it may turn out to be worse 
if circumstances change.169 This danger is more likely to scare off lower-income 
taxpayers. 
Arguably, even a policy that dominantly benefits wealthy taxpayers should 
be seen as enhancing social welfare if other taxpayers are not harmed. Placing aside 
externalities,170 revenue-neutral tax experimentation, unlike virtually all other 
conceivable tax reform,171 is Pareto optimal,172 and Pareto improvements are often 
thought to be welfare-improving,173 despite experimental evidence that people 
sometimes are willing to accept Pareto-dominated outcomes.174 The argument 
against tax law benefits for the wealthy that do not reduce resources to others 
requires a modification of the Pareto criterion so that each person’s welfare depends 
                                                 
proportional, progressive, or regressive; nor, if progression or regression is the chosen mode, does 
it indicate how steep the slope should be.” BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 3.1.4; accord 
McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 610 (“The word ‘appropriate’ is not self-defining”); id. (“VE [vertical 
equity] could apply to a tax system that is progressive, proportional or regressive.”). 
167 The simplest tax return, the 1040EZ, can only be used by taxpayers with taxable income below 
$100,000. See IRS, Which Form—1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ?, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc352 
(last visited March 1, 2018).  The most complicated return, the 1040, includes numerous schedules 
for more complex tax situations. 
168 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 55 n.31 (2d ed. 1989); 
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90, 
92–93 (1971). 
169 For example, consider the example alternative tax regime in section Error! Reference source n
ot found. where taxpayers pay a lump-sum in exchange for lower marginal rates. Although the high-
earnings-potential taxpayer H may expect to benefit from this alternative regime, if H loses her job, 
then H will be left much worse off than under generally applicable tax law, having to pay the lump-
sum but getting no benefit from the lower marginal rates.  
170 See infra Part II.D. 
171 See, e.g., Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on 
Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8, 42 (2001) (noting that “any type of radical tax 
change” is likely to violate the Pareto criterion, at least in the short term). 
172 A pareto improvement is one that makes some better off and no one worse off. See JOHN BLACK 
ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 301 (4th ed. 2012). 
173 For a defense of using the Pareto principle in policy analysis, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1015 (2001).  
174 See, e.g., Dorothea K. Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with 
Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences—An Experimental Study, 76 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 238 
(2010). 
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on relative wealth.175 Revenue-neutral tax experiments from which wealthy 
taxpayers benefit may still be Pareto-improving, however.  In the example of the 
entertainment deduction, it seems unlikely that the utility of non-wealthy taxpayers 
falls because wealthy taxpayers reallocate spending from the entertainment 
category. Indeed, such a change plausibly might reduce the perception of 
inequality, as opting-in taxpayers have lower after tax income. Thus, if inequality 
is measured solely through a measure like the Gini coefficient,176 inequality is 
reduced.177 In this case, experimentation might produce greater inequality of 
happiness, but not greater financial inequality. 
Suppose, however, that tax experimentation is thought to increase 
inequality under some definition sufficiently to outweigh any efficiency benefits. 
At least in principle, any benefit accruing to high-income taxpayers could be 
reallocated in part to low-income taxpayers. That is, if high-income taxpayers 
expect to receive a utility benefit equal to $1,000 from some sort of tax 
experimentation, then the law creating such experimentation could impose a new 
tax on higher-income taxpayers and redistribute the receipts to lower-income 
taxpayers. This argument is frequently made on behalf of programs that increase 
economic efficiency but may have negative redistributive consequences,178 and it 
leads to the retort that the mere possibility of redistribution does not justify a policy 
if the law creating the efficient policy does not effect redistribution.179 In principle, 
however, a hypothetical statute that authorized tax experimentation in conjunction 
with other progressive tax changes could answer the distribution objection.  
C. Manipulation 
Taxpayers may attempt to exploit the availability of tax experiments180 in 
several ways. First, taxpayers who know about an experiment may change their 
                                                 
175 See Sven Ove Hansson, Welfare, Justice, and Pareto Efficiency, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL 
PRAC. 361 (2004) (suggesting such an adjustment); Khandakar Qudrat-I Elahi, Economic Inequality 
and Paretian Welfare Economics: Some Insinuating Questions, 35 FORUM SOC. ECON. 19 (2005) 
(critiquing the Pareto criterion given concerns about inequality). 
176 See Corrado Gini, Concentration and Dependency Ratios, 87 RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA 
769 (1997) (providing English translation of Gini’s 1909 article in Italian). 
177 The Gini coefficient is generally reported as a function of household income. See, e.g., JESSICA 
L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 at 8 
(Sept. 2017). Household income would not include deductible business expenses.  
178 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000). 
179 See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (arguing that just as transactions costs can prevent achievement of 
efficiency goals, so too can political action costs prevent achievement of distributive goals). 
180 See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 869 (1999) 
  TAX EXPERIMENTATION  42 
 
 
behavior to become eligible to be invited into the alternative regime. Relatedly, 
taxpayers may change their behavior or their reporting so that they are matched to 
taxpayers in the control group likely to pay low taxes. Second, taxpayers subject to 
an alternative tax regime may minimize their taxes by shifting gross income and 
deductions between the tax years subject to the alternative regime and tax years not 
subject to the alternative regime.  Third, taxpayers may change their tax status.  We 
will consider each of these in turn. 
1. Eligibility and Matching 
Some taxpayers always attempt to game the tax laws to their advantage, and 
the same will doubtless be true of eligibility for tax experiments. Tax experiments 
might be limited to particular taxpayers, such as members of a particular industry. 
For example, the government might consider limiting eligibility for an experiment 
on eliminating deductibility of travel expenses to an industry in which such 
expenses generally seem unnecessary, such as health professionals who currently 
can deduct trips to conferences at fancy vacation destinations.181 This is, however, 
an incomplete solution. A taxpayer who does not expect to need to take significant 
travel deductions anyway might seek to classify as a health professional, even if the 
taxpayer’s business is only marginally related to health. 
A taxpayer might have similar manipulation incentives even in an 
experiment for which the taxpayer is clearly eligible or for which there are no 
eligibility limitations. Recall that after a treatment group taxpayer calculates tax 
liability under the new rules, this amount is multiplied by a number chosen to ensure 
revenue neutrality. That multiplier is based on the quotient of the tax liability one 
would expect the taxpayer to have based on the taxpayer’s past data if assigned to 
the control group divided by the nominal tax liability expected if assigned to the 
treatment group. If the government uses a multivariate regression, the taxpayer 
hopes to have characteristics that lead to a prediction that the taxpayer will have 
much higher nominal liability in the treatment group. A taxpayer planning ahead 
may be able to generate data in a year before the experiment that will lead to such 
predictions. 
The taxpayer’s manipulation incentives will be the opposite in a tax 
experiment assessing the efficiency of a new deduction. Then, the taxpayer would 
like to be matched to other participants whose behavior will change the least. For 
example, if the experiment considers the possibility of a new deduction for certain 
commuting expenses, then the taxpayer would like to be matched with taxpayers 
                                                 
(“Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover 
how to take advantage of them.”).  
181 Cf. http://www.doctorsreview.com (allowing search for medical conferences based on desired 
destination).  
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who are likely to receive only a small benefit from the availability of the commuting 
deduction. A taxpayer who can claim a large amount for an experimental new 
deduction will be able to keep most of this benefit, if the regression predicts that 
the taxpayer’s nominal taxable income would be similar whether the taxpayer is in 
the control or treatment group. In an extreme case, a taxpayer might move very 
close to work in the year before the experiment and then move much further away 
in the experimental year. 
The tax authority might take several steps to limit the success of such 
manipulation. First, the government might define the relevant tax provision 
narrowly to reduce such gaming. The travel experiment might affect only 
deductions for travel to health-related conferences, and the commuting deduction 
might be eligible only for taxpayers who live a certain distance from work. Second, 
the government can keep manipulable eligibility criteria and the variables used to 
match taxpayers confidential. The IRS already does something similar, keeping 
confidential the criteria that affect the probability that the IRS will audit a 
taxpayer.182 On the other hand, there may be value in publishing such data to allow 
the public to better inform itself about whether an experiment was successful. 
Third, the government can use older data that predate the announcement of the 
experiment (not just data that predate the experimental year) to filter out 
opportunistic taxpayers. Fourth, the government might collect and then heavily 
weight data not easily manipulated by taxpayers, such as the college or graduate 
degrees received by the taxpayer, or the industry of past employers. 
Ultimately, some manipulation is still likely to occur on the margins. The 
problem, however, should not be overstated. Tax law already presents many 
opportunities for fraud, and criminal and civil liability may deter many taxpayers 
from fraudulently filling out their tax returns in the hope of receiving a deduction.183 
If, nonetheless, many taxpayers seek to define themselves in a way that they 
anticipate will lead to better treatment, the strategy will be self-defeating. For 
example, if many non-health professionals classified themselves as health 
professionals, then the non-health professionals would be matched with many other 
non-health professionals. The problem is then reduced to the danger that real health 
professionals would not want to participate in the experiment, for fear of being 
matched with non-health professionals. But if the experiment failed for this reason, 
that would simply be an indication that the underlying hypothetical tax provision 
(elimination of a deduction but only for health professionals) is unworkable because 
                                                 
182 IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2 (“DIF mathematical formulas are confidential and 
for official use only. The DIF score assigned to a return should not be disclosed.”).  
183 If the federal government has insufficient resources to prosecute tax fraud, qui tam suits could 
enable greater enforcement. See Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax? Lessons from the States, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (2013). 
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the eligibility criteria are easily manipulated. This itself is a valuable lesson for a 
tax experiment. 
2. Income and Deduction Shifting 
Taxpayers who are subject to an alternative tax treatment may try to 
minimize their taxes by shifting income and deductions from years in which they 
are subject to the treatment to years when the generally applicable tax rules apply 
to them. Or, taxpayers may try to shift gross income and deductions in the opposite 
direction, to a year covered by the alternative tax regime. For example, if the 
alternative tax regime were a lower marginal rate of taxation in exchange for losing 
a deduction, a taxpayer may shift as much income as possible into years covered 
by the alternative regime. The taxpayer might do this by negotiating with their 
employer to forgo a bonus in a year subject to generally applicable tax law, with 
the understanding that the taxpayer would receive a larger bonus the next year, 
when the alternative regime would apply. Meanwhile, in the opposite type of 
experiment, where the taxpayer expects to pay a higher tax rate, the taxpayer could 
seek to shift income to a later year.  
These problems can be addressed. The alternative tax regime could apply 
for multiple years to minimize the potential for short-term mischief. Taxpayers 
might be informed of their group assignment on January 1, to prevent any 
manipulation in advance of the experiment. For each year of the experiment, a 
separate model would be developed of the behavior of control group and treatment 
group taxpayers, and so the multiplier a taxpayer receives would vary from year to 
year.  The government would assess the experiment on a year-to-year basis, and it 
might focus analysis especially on taxpayers entering the first year of the 
experiment, since income shifting is likely to be most plausible near the end of an 
experiment. In principle, an experiment could even be designed to be permanent. 
A taxpayer giving up a deduction would be giving that deduction up permanently, 
and each year would receive some discount in exchange. If the tax law changed so 
that no taxpayers received this deduction anymore, then the multiplier would end 
up being closer to 1.  
A less drastic approach is for the separate tax treatment to apply only during 
the experimental period (perhaps even just a year), but for a multiplier to be 
calculated for each taxpayer for each subsequent year. This addresses the concern 
that even if an experiment is revenue-neutral during the period of the experiment, 
it might not be revenue-neutral afterward. So long as the multiplier approach is used 
in all subsequent years,184 the experiment is guaranteed to be revenue neutral over 
                                                 
184 Eventually, too few taxpayers might remain living to enable meaningful comparison of the 
treatment and control groups. At this point, it would likely be appropriate to use data from previous 
years. 
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taxpayers’ entire lives. Thus, if treatment taxpayers were shifting income into the 
years of the experiment, they would receive large discounts during this time, but 
they might report less nominal tax liability after the experiment ends and therefore 
have to pay higher tax rates then. 
The length of the experiment aside, tax law includes tools to discourage 
gaming. Auditors should be advised to rigorously apply the existing tax-law 
doctrines that prevent shifting gross income and deductions between years, such as 
the constructive receipt doctrine185 and the economic performance doctrine.186 
Meanwhile, the government might prioritize experimenting with alternative tax 
regimes that limit the scope of income-shifting. Capital gains, for example, might 
be particularly easy to shift,187 and so the government might prioritize tax 
experiments that apply to only ordinary income (i.e., income that is not capital 
gains).188 
3. Status Changes 
Individuals can get married or divorced; corporations can merge with others 
or divide into multiple corporations (e.g., by spinning off a business into a new 
corporation). If a taxpayer is subject to an alternative tax regime, how would such 
status changes apply? The rules governing such status changes must be designed 
with care to prevent opportunistic, inefficient behavior. For example, suppose that 
company T is a treatment group taxpayer subject to an alternative tax regime, while 
company A is not—but A is in a position so that the alternative regime would reduce 
its taxes, because it would benefit from the experiment more than most members of 
the treatment group. Suppose further that it makes no economic sense for A to 
acquire T, aside from tax considerations. If A could become subject to the 
alternative regime by merging with T, the result would be an economically 
inefficient merger, plus a tax windfall to A.  
                                                 
185 This doctrine prevents cash method taxpayers (which are the vast majority of individual 
taxpayers) from postponing the reporting of gross income by failing to exercise the power to collect 
it. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 5.9.  
186 This doctrine prevents accrual method taxpayers from taking a deduction before they have 
provided economic performance, such as delivering goods or services to the buyer. I.R.C. § 461(h). 
See generally STEPHEN GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 4.04[3] (2016 ed.).  
187 Joseph J. Cordes & Harvey Galper, Tax Shelter Activity: Lessons from Twenty Years of Evidence, 
38 NAT’L TAX J. 305, 322 (1985) (when capital gains rates are low, investments shift to activities 
generating capital gains). 
188 Many other countries’ tax systems have very different treatment for income from capital and 
income from labor. See, e.g., KLAUS SIEKER, PORTFOLIO 7140: BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN GERMANY 
¶ IV.B.1 (1st ed. 2017 rev.) (discussing Germany’s special treatment of capital income like 
dividends and interest); cf. I.R.C. § 64 (defining “ordinary income”).  
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Further, status changes can complicate the goal of achieving revenue 
neutrality. The multiplier that would be applied to T’s nominal tax liability depends 
on T’s pre-experiment tax returns. But if T is suddenly much larger after acquiring 
A, paying far greater taxes, that would have the effect of lowering the taxes of all 
treatment group taxpayers. The average multiplier will be equal to the total tax 
liability of control group taxpayers divided by the total nominal tax liability of 
treatment group taxpayers, so increasing the denominator reduces the multiplier. 
This would particularly be a problem if treatment group taxpayers are 
systematically more likely to acquire other companies than control group taxpayers. 
The reverse tendency would also create problems of evaluation. 
But tax law already deals with similar problems of status changes.189 
Individuals’ divorces and corporations’ dividing are easy. If a married couple is 
subject to an alternative tax regime, and they get divorced, then both ex-spouses 
should remain subject to the alternative regime. If a corporation is subject to an 
alternative regime and divides, such as by spinning off a business into a new 
corporation,190 then both the original corporation and the spun-off company will 
remain subject to the alternative regime.191 The model used to determine multipliers 
would be generated based on the combined nominal tax of any spouses or pair of 
companies that split up. Then, the multiplier would apply equally to each spouse 
paying separately or to each entity.   
Marriages and especially corporate mergers are more complicated. To 
prevent marriages from affecting tax liability, the most straightforward approach is 
to require all participants in an experiment to file individually, whether as a single 
individual or as married filing separately.192 This would be true even for control 
group taxpayers, to facilitate the comparison between the control group and the 
treatment group. The drawback of this approach is that eliminating the option to 
file a joint return will be disadvantageous to some taxpayers. Although some 
                                                 
189 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 382 (dealing with corporate tax attributes like Net Operating Losses in the 
context of corporate acquisitions).  
190 E.g., I.R.C. § 355 (providing tax rules for corporate separations like spin-offs, split-offs, and 
split-ups).  
191 Cf. BORIS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 11.12 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2015-02) (discussing how, in a corporate separation 
under I.R.C. § 355, certain tax attributes are continued).  
192 Some circumstances already exist where one spouse’s unusual tax situation bars a married couple 
from filing joint returns, including one spouse using the calendar year as their calendar year and the 
other spouse using a different taxable year, I.R.C. § 6013(a)(2), and one spouse being a nonresident 
alien, id. § 6013(a)(1). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 111.5.2 (discussing 
married-filing-jointly returns versus married-filing-separately returns in depth). Moreover, filing 
separately sometimes allows taxpayers to get certain tax benefits that would not be available (or not 
as available) if filing jointly. See id. (discussing how filing separately can maximize the deduction 
under I.R.C. § 213(a)).  
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taxpayers suffer a “marriage penalty,”193 others enjoy a “marriage bonus,”194 and 
under current U.S. tax law, the married-filing-separately status is generally seen as 
disadvantaged relative to the others,195 with some exceptions.196 Thus, taxpayers 
might elect to participate in tax experiments only if they are willing to forego this 
option. The best long-term solution might be for all taxpayers to file separately.197 
While this would be a significant change in U.S. law, most developed countries 
have always had individual filing or have made this switch in recent decades,198 and 
there are strong arguments that the United States should switch as well.199  Of 
course, a tax experiment might be used to determine whether to eliminate this 
option in the United States. Meanwhile, there is no impediment to tax 
experimentation in countries with individual filing. 
In corporate mergers,200 where the target company is subject to an 
alternative regime but the acquiring company is not, there are two possible options. 
First, the target may be required to maintain separate corporate form as the 
acquirer’s subsidiary,201 and continue to file its own separate tax return using the 
alternative tax regime, without the option of consolidating its returns with the 
acquirer’s.202 So long as the acquirer and the target remain legally separate entities, 
                                                 
193 See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, A Practical Solution to the Marriage Penalty, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 
653-58 (2017) (providing statistics and history). 
194 For a detailed statistical analysis of who receives a penalty and who receives a bonus under 
current tax law, see Amir El-Sibaie, Marriage Penalties and Bonuses Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, TAX FOUNDATION (Feb. 14, 2018), available at https://taxfoundation.org/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-
marriage-penalty-marriage-bonus/. 
195 See, e.g., Ryznar, supra note 193, at 655 (“Filing separately is, on average, not advantageous 
because fewer credits and deductions are available, and the tax brackets are narrower than those of 
single filers.”). 
196 See, e.g., Laura Saunders, When ‘Married, Filing Separately’ Lowers Your Tax Bill, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 23, 2018, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-married-filing-separately-lowers-
your-tax-bill-1519381801. 
197 But see Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185 (2014) 
(suggesting more modest changes to tax law). 
198 See Fox, supra note 7, at 9-10. 
199 See, e.g., id. at 48-49 (arguing that the current regime distorts couple’s marriage decisions). 
200 E.g., I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) & (2) (defining the various types of reorganizations available for the tax-
free merger of two corporations).  
201 There are a number of methods of tax-free acquisition already available that would allow the 
target and acquirer to remain separate corporate forms, including “B” reorganizations under id. 
§ 368(a)(1)(B), forward triangular mergers under id. § 368(a)(2)(D), and reverse triangular mergers 
under id. § 368(a)(2)(E).  
202 See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 97.2 (describing consolidated returns). 
Eligibility of subsidiaries to consolidate their returns with their parent’s corporate group has long 
been limited, see I.R.C. § 1504(b), and subsidiaries (e.g., Target in the example above) subject to 
alternative tax regimes would simply be a new limitation. Non-consolidation of returns would not 
lead to taxation of the subsidiary’s income at both the subsidiary and parent corporation level, thanks 
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the accounting is straightforward. A complication here is that the combined entities 
might engage in transactions seeking to take advantage of the differential tax 
treatment of the two entities. This problem is familiar to tax law,203 with transfer 
pricing regulation seeking to ensure that transactions reflect what parties would 
agree to in arms-length negotiations.204 
Second, the target may be allowed to fully merge and consolidate with the 
acquirer, but the combined corporation would have to calculate its taxes once using 
the alternative regime and a second time using the default regime. The actual tax 
liability would be a weighted average of the two, in proportion to the relative value 
of the target and acquirer at the time of the merger.205 The proportion of nominal 
tax liability attributable to the treatment group entity would be used in modeling 
the effects of the experiment more broadly. The principal challenge with this 
approach is valuation. If the target and acquirer are public corporations, then their 
stocks’ market capitalization can be used to determine valuation.206 In other 
circumstances, the relative valuations might be a matter of dispute between the tax 
authority and the taxpayer, as the taxpayer might seek a larger or smaller 
capitalization based on which tax treatment seem more attractive. The costs of such 
gaming are likely to be low, however, given that the revenue-neutrality constraint 
is unlikely to make either option much more attractive than the other. Nonetheless, 
the transactions costs associated with arguing about valuation might discourage 
corporate participation in experiments on relatively minor tax code provisions. 
D. Externalities 
Many tax provisions, such as business expense deductions,207 exist to 
properly calculate taxpayer income.208 But other tax provisions are “tax 
                                                 
to the dividends received deduction at I.R.C. § 243(a)(3).  
203 Transfer pricing also may become an issue as the IRS seeks to limit the scope of passthrough 
income rules. See Kamin et al., supra note 2, at 11 (“[T]hese kinds of transfer pricing games among 
related parties have proven very difficult to stamp out in other contexts.”). 
204 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482. 
205 An analogous regime is used by I.R.C. § 382(b)(1) to limit the use of tax attributes (like net 
operating losses and built-in losses) of an acquired corporation in proportion to the value of the 
acquired corporation. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 191, ¶ 14.42[3] (explaining 
functioning of § 382’s limitations).  
206 Treas. Reg. 1.382-2(a)(3)(i) (providing that in calculating “value”, control premiums or similar 
considerations are ignored).    
207 E.g., I.R.C. § 162.  
208 Stanley S Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act 
of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679, 679–80 (1976) (distinguishing “the structural 
provisions necessary to the application of a normal income tax, such as the definition of net income” 
from “special preferences found in every income tax”).  
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expenditures” that further some additional goal,209 such as creating positive 
externalities or reducing negative externalities.210 A potential objection to tax 
tailoring is that allowing taxpayers to opt out of such externality-addressing tax 
expenditures will adversely affect third parties. For example, the R&D tax credit211 
is often defended as encouraging scientific research that will benefit society as a 
whole,212 because companies cannot appropriate the full value of their research 
efforts.213 Similarly, tax expenditures subsidizing higher education214 are justified 
by its positive externalities.215 Other examples include the various credits,216 
deductions,217 and exclusions218 subsidizing energy-efficiency and clean-energy, all 
of which are justified as reducing the negative externalities from fossil fuels.219  
An argument can be made for preventing alternative tax regimes from 
removing such tax expenditures. Similarly, the absence of some deductions could 
be justified on externality grounds. For example, the absence of a deduction or 
exclusion for the cost of gas used commuting by car220 might be justified partly by 
                                                 
209 See Cliff Fleming & Robert Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative 
Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010). 
But see Borris Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L 
TAX J. 244 (1969) (criticizing the concept of tax expenditures); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. 
Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (Mar. 30, 1992) (same). 
210 See infra notes 212-219; see also Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to the ‘Theory of Tax 
Expenditures’: The Case of Charitable Giving, in BROOKINGS INST., THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 
99 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).  
211 I.R.C. § 41; see also id. § 174 (allowing immediate deduction for R&D expenditures, in 
contravention of the general principle of capitalization for expenditures creating multi-year 
benefits).  
212 See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can a Patent Box Promote Advanced 
Manufacturing?, 147 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347 (June 22, 2015) (noting that “decades of research by 
leading economists indicates that externalities from R&D not only exist but are very large”).  
213 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 104 (Comm. Print 112-45, 2012) 
(“[B]usinesses in general are unlikely to invest in R&D in amounts consistent with its social 
returns.”).  
214 E.g., I.R.C. § 25A(i); id. § 117 (scholarships); id. § 529 (education savings accounts); id. § 221 
(deduction on student-loan interest); id. § 222 (deduction for qualified tuition); id. § 127 (exclusion 
for employer-provided educational assistance).  
215 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 213, at 633.  
216 I.R.C. § 45 (credit for renewable energy generation, as from wind).  
217 I.R.C. § 179D (deduction for all or part of the cost of energy-efficient commercial building 
property).  
218 I.R.C. § 136 (exclusion for energy conservation subsidies provided by utilities).  
219 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 213, at 113–253.  
220 See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945) (denying deduction for commuting expenses, 
based on predecessor to I.R.C. § 262, which denies a deduction for personal, family, and living 
expenses).  
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environmental considerations.221 Allowing taxpayers to opt into such a deduction 
in exchange for higher tax rates might reduce social welfare. Thus, the tax authority 
should hesitate to offer a tax experiment that would eliminate for treatment 
taxpayers a tax provision justified (or justifiable) based on its effects on others. 
There may be some situations, however, in which concerns about 
externalities could be addressed by changing the unit offered the alternative tax 
regime. Consider, for example, the home-mortgage interest deduction.222 The 
deduction’s defenders argue that it encourages homeownership, producing positive 
externalities including better-maintained neighborhoods and greater social capital 
in neighborhoods.223 Allowing opting-into an alternative tax regime without the 
home-mortgage interest deduction (in exchange for lower rates) might then have 
negative effects on neighborhoods. 
A response to this problem would be to allow entire neighborhoods (or 
entire collections of neighborhoods) to opt into such alternative regimes. 
Specifically, the decisions to opt in could be made by a home-owners association 
(HOA) or a municipality. This election would “run with the land,” so that home 
mortgage interest could never be deducted for a home within that HOA or 
municipality, but any taxpayer principally residing in a home would benefit from 
the lower rates. The opt-in is thus “in rem,” attaching to the property (i.e., the 
homes), regardless of whether it is subsequently transferred. Allowing the opt-in to 
be done by the HOA or the municipality ensures that externalities are internalized 
at the level making the decision to opt in.  This would, of course, require enabling 
legislation, above and beyond that needed for tax experimentation in general. 
Random assignment of some HOAs or municipalities that opt-in to a control 
group would allow rigorous determination of whether the home mortgage interest 
deduction produces the predicted neighborhood benefits. In theory, the deduction 
should lead to more investment in housing, so assuming the experiment includes at 
least some not-yet-developed land, one should expect that such land would be more 
likely to be developed than corresponding land in the control group. Property values 
similarly ought to be higher in areas with the deduction than without, as those in 
the treatment group allocate more of their money to non-house spending.224 Of 
course, if the primary goal of an experiment were informational, then a home 
                                                 
221 See Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 24 
VA. TAX REV. 587, 635–40 (2005) (discussing how the existing tax benefit for employer-provided 
parking creates externalities, including more car-generated pollution and congestion).  
222 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D).  
223 See MARK P. KEIGHTLY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND 
PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 8–11 (Mar. 18, 2014) (reviewing literature 
on this matter); William Rohe et al., Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, in BROOKINGS 
INST., LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP 381–406 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002).  
224 For a general argument that laws affect housing prices, see Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local 
Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (2008). 
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mortgage interest deduction experiment with individual subjects might be more 
effective. If the deduction truly has externalities, then one should expect houses 
near those randomized to the treatment of giving up the deduction to decline in 
value relative to houses near those randomized to control. 
The government also might be able to experiment with tax provisions 
thought to provide positive externalities by defining a new treatment group that is 
designed to promote externalities but in a different way. For example, the 
government might consider replacing the R&D tax credit with a system in which 
the government directly grants subsidies in the form of tax credits to companies 
based on the quality of their research proposals or the importance of research 
undertaken.225 Such an experiment could still be revenue neutral. Taxpayers might 
be willing to opt in, if they think they would benefit from greater tax benefits for 
more important research, with reduced tax benefits for less important research. The 
government might then seek to evaluate both whether the change is attractive to 
taxpayers and whether the change indeed produces more valuable research. As with 
assessing externalities from the home-mortgage interest deduction, this analysis 
would require data beyond that available from tax returns. 
III. BEYOND REVENUE NEUTRALITY 
A. Participation Inducements 
Perhaps the most significant challenge to tax experimentation is that few 
taxpayers may agree to participate. Opting in to an experiment requires some 
research into the tax law issue. Taxpayers also need to assess the possibility of 
adverse selection. Once again, if the taxpayers most likely to participate are those 
with private information that they would gain greatly from a tax law change, then 
taxpayers who expect to benefit only slightly with respect to their nominal tax 
liability should be expected to lose money once revenue-neutral adjustments apply. 
Above, 226we discussed one solution to adverse selection that makes taxpayers 
hesitant to participate: designating an experiment opt-out or even mandatory. But 
we also recognized strong arguments against such an approach to these strategies. 
An alternative possibility would be for the government to offer inducements 
to taxpayers willing to participate. All taxpayers who opt into the experiment, or 
perhaps only those assigned to treatment, might receive some tax discount (perhaps 
a small percentage discount on their tax returns). Even relatively modest 
inducements might be sufficient to overcome adverse selection problems. With 
                                                 
225 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303 (2013) (discussing the varieties of incentives governments can provide for innovation, 
beyond just R&D tax credits).   
226 See supra Part II.A. 
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such participation inducements, tax experimentation would not be truly revenue 
neutral; treatment group taxpayers would be promised that they would pay less on 
average. The government would be sacrificing revenue for the information to be 
obtained from a tax experiment. But taxpayers in the treatment group would still be 
matched to control group taxpayers. This has the useful effect of ensuring that 
taxpayers will be willing to participate only if they believe that the tax changes will 
not overly distort their own incentives. 
The government might offer inducements for particular experiments, but it 
also might offer inducements to taxpayers willing to participate in a wide range of 
tax experiments. The government might simultaneously execute a wide range of 
experiments on various tax issues. This can help limit adverse selection. Because 
taxpayers will anticipate that the chances of being randomized into the treatment 
group of any particular experiment will be relatively low, participation is not likely 
to be limited to taxpayers who expect to benefit disproportionately from that tax 
experiment. 
B. Experiments on Tax Rates 
Participation inducements also can be used to facilitate experiments on tax 
rates. Consider, for example, a tax experiment in which some taxpayers will be 
randomly selected to pay an extra two percent in taxes, while others receive a three 
percent discount on their taxes. The purpose of such an experiment would be to 
assess the effect of the level of taxation on other variables, such as taxpayer work 
effort and job creation. These are among the most contentious issues in tax policy,227 
but randomized studies have been unavailable,228 and interpretive issues make it 
virtually impossible to generalize from existing evidence about long-term effects 
of marginal tax rate changes.229  An important question for policymakers is whether 
higher tax rates reduce taxpayers’ willingness to work—that is, whether the income 
or substitution effects of taxes dominate.230  
                                                 
227 See, e.g., Saez et al., supra note 18 (providing a review of the literature). 
228 Id. at 23 (“Although we refer in this section to income tax rate schedule changes as a treatment, 
they certainly do not represent a classical treatment in which a random selection of taxpayers is 
presented with a changed tax rate schedule, while a control group of taxpayers is not so subject.”). 
229 Id. at 43 (“Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income in the long run (i.e., exceeding a few 
years) are plagued by extremely difficult issues of identification, so difficult that we believe that 
there are no convincing estimates of the long-run elasticity of reported taxable income to changes 
in the marginal tax rate.”). 
230 The substitution effect suggests that workers will work harder with lower taxes, substituting labor 
for leisure, while the income effect suggests that lower taxes may cause workers to engage in more 
leisure because they have less need to work. See, e.g., LIBBY RITTENBERG & TIMOTHY 
TREGARTHEN, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS § 12.3, available at 
https://catalog.flatworldknowledge.com/bookhub/21?e=rittenberg-ch12_s03.  If only marginal tax 
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Such experiments might produce greater objections than revenue-neutral 
experimentation, because the horizontal inequities resulting are greater. This is 
indeed a principal reason that this Article has focused on revenue-neutral 
experimentation. Nonetheless, the possibility of such experiments should not be 
dismissed, because they would produce a form of data otherwise almost impossible 
to obtain. Moreover, we have seen above that concerns about horizontal inequity 
may be overstated. Taxpayers might purchase insurance against being randomized 
to the group that receives a tax increase,231 with such insurance paying an ex ante 
lump sum to such taxpayers. That would limit the experiments’ usefulness in 
providing insight into the effects of overall wealth on individual behavior, but such 
experiments could still help identify marginal incentive effects of government 
policy. 
With revenue-neutral tax experiments, an experiment can often be 
considered successful simply on the basis that informed taxpayers would prefer the 
treatment group to the control group. With non-revenue-neutral experiments, the 
mere existence of participating taxpayers cannot be a strong argument in favor of 
the policy. Still, success might be measured based on the effects of the experiment. 
For example, if an experiment demonstrated that taxpayers who suffered an 
increase in the tax rate did not reduce work effort as measured by pretax income, 
or even increased work effort, that would furnish an argument in favor of increasing 
the tax rate. On the other hand, if an increase in the tax rate in fact lowered tax 
revenues, that would indicate that the government was already on the wrong side 
of the Laffer Curve232 and that a tax increase would not be advisable. Between these 
extremes, analysts might reach different normative conclusions.  
C. Self-Executing Tax Experiments 
How should the tax authority decide whether to expand an experiment when 
it shows some effects that would be generally viewed as beneficial and some that 
would be generally viewed as harmful? And at what point should the legislature 
make a tax provision permanent? These are fundamentally political trade-offs, that 
experimentation can produce information but that public officials ultimately must 
decide how to act based on such information. But a legislature authorizing tax 
experimentation could specify ex ante what the consequences of such an 
experiment might be. For example, a legislature authorizing an experiment on a tax 
                                                 
rates change, then there should be no income effect, but virtually any tax reform will affect both 
inframarginal and marginal tax rates. 
231 See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
232 See Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future (Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder No. 1765, June 1, 2004) (discussing the curve, which postulates that tax revenues 
will be zero at both 0% and 100% tax rates). 
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increase might provide that the tax increase will be applied to all taxpayers so long 
as the experiment establishes that a 1% increase in tax leads to no more than a 0.5% 
decrease in work effort.  
Such self-executing experiments233 can facilitate legislative transparency 
and honesty. During the debate on the recent tax reform, brief consideration was 
given to the possibility of a trigger that would automatically increase tax rates if 
revenues fell short of projections, but the Senate parliamentarian rejected the 
plan.234 The virtue of such a trigger is that it punishes cheap talk. A legislator 
endorsing a tax cut can make more credible the legislator’s claimed revenue 
projections by agreeing to a trigger. But there are problems with such a trigger as 
well.235 Revenue may fall short of projections for exogenous reasons, such as a 
recession. Moreover, increasing taxes would generally be a poor fiscal policy 
response to a recession. Taxes generally fall during recessions, and this “automatic 
stabilizer” may reduce the extent of the economic downturn.236 An experiment, 
however, can provide a better measure of a policy’s effects, because the treatment 
group is compared to the control group. Thus, if legislators favor a tax cut because 
they believe that it will largely be self-financing, it might make sense for the tax 
cut initially to be experimental, with the result of the experiment determining 
whether the tax cut should be made permanent.  
A reasonable objection is that it will be difficult to craft in advance of a tax 
experiment a measure that fully captures its effects. Legislators might hope that a 
tax cut not only will lead to more work effort on the part of the recipients of the tax 
cut, but also greater job creation by these individuals, who might be more likely to 
start or expand businesses. Yet it will not always be straightforward to attribute job 
gains and losses to particular taxpayers. The self-execution outcome might thus 
depend on easily measured variables that may proxy for broader economic effects. 
One form of self-executing tax experiment might allow for tax law to move 
in opposite directions depending on the result, for example with a failed tax cut 
experiment leading to an automatic tax increase. Suppose that legislators disagree 
about the effects of increasing taxes on the wealthy, with more conservative 
legislators worrying that this will lead the wealthy to work less hard and more 
liberal legislators taking the opposite position. This is an empirical issue, and it is 
an empirical issue to which an experiment is responsive. But many legislators seem 
                                                 
233 See Abramowicz, supra note 9, at 985-87 (discussing the possibility of self-execution). 
234 See Senate Republicans Scramble to Find Revenue for Tax Bill with Vote Expected Friday, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2017. 
235 Some of these problems are political. See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, Senate Leaders Agree to Add 
Fiscal Trigger to Tax Reform Bill, TAX ANALYSTS, Nov. 29, 2017 (reporting Sen. Kennedy’s 
reaction to the prospect of automatic tax increases). 
236 See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as 
Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 37. 
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unlikely to change their positions even if an experiment provides powerful 
evidence, but self-execution might force a policy result. Such a self-executing 
experiment might be easier to pass than an experiment that can only move the law 
in one direction. If legislators on each side truly believe that the experiment will 
vindicate their respective empirical positions, then both sides should be eager to 
support such a self-executing experiment. Meanwhile, a refusal to agree to such a 
self-executing experiment may expose legislators who claim that a tax law change 
would lead to a particular result but do not in fact believe this to be true.  
D. Larger Experimental Units 
Non-revenue-neutral experiments, whether self-executing or not, will 
produce information about how individual taxpayers respond to changes in tax law, 
such as increases or decreases in tax rates. But often, the relevant question will be 
how these changes affect others. We noted above that we might be interested in 
whether businesses affected by a tax law change increase or decrease their hiring 
levels. Moreover, even when interested in taxpayer responses, that information 
might not be clear from the taxpayers’ tax returns. For example, an experiment 
might impose a tax penalty on taxpayers who fail to purchase health insurance. The 
Affordable Care Act included such an “individual mandate,”237 which the Supreme 
Court upheld as a tax,238 but this individual mandate was removed in the most recent 
tax reform.239 Tax returns might tell us whether a penalty leads more taxpayers to 
purchase insurance, but it cannot provide information about how it affects these 
taxpayers’ health.  
A possible solution would be for tax experiments to occur at levels greater 
than the individual taxpayer. We have already seen one example of this, the 
possibility of a revenue-neutral tax experiment for the home mortgage interest 
deduction, where home owners’ associations could decide to participate or not. Tax 
experiments also might be executed at the level of a state, county, or locality. These 
approaches might better indicate the effect of tax rates on hiring than an experiment 
applying to individuals. It may be easy to obtain data on business activity or 
economic growth in a region or for an industry, even when it might be difficult to 
attribute that hiring to any particular individual. Similarly, unless the government 
plans to start collecting health information on tax returns, it may be more capable 
of evaluating health statistics already collected at various levels of government.240 
                                                 
237 I.R.C. § 5000A.   
238 Nat. Fedn. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 567 US 519 (2012).   
239 Pub. L. No. 115-97 § 11081 (“Elimination of Shared Responsibility Payment For Individuals 
Failing To Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage”).  
240 The National Center for Health Statistics, for example, collects much relevant data. See National 
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Such tax experiments reduce but do not eliminate the danger that a tax 
experiment will simply shift economic activity.241 If a tax experiment results in 
some individuals receiving a tax increase and others receiving a tax decrease, then 
taxpayers may seek to take advantage of these discrepancies. For example, a 
married couple filing separately242 might seek to ensure that income appears on the 
tax form of the member of the couple who enjoys the lower tax rate.243 Such games 
are more difficult to play when a tax is applied to an entire city, county or state. 
There is, however, still a danger that economic activity may move across city or 
state borders. At least on the margins, businesses will have incentives to move 
activity from a location in a high-tax treatment group to a location in a low-tax 
treatment group. Thus, tax experiments can produce distortions. Moreover, tax 
experiment may give one business an advantage over a competitor, making tax 
changes much more consequential than if they were applied uniformly.  This is 
problematic also because it may lead to misinterpretation. But if experimental units 
are sufficiently large, such effects may be relatively small, and experiments of this 
sort may provide the best available evidence of the effects of tax policy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered a range of possible applications of tax 
experimentation, from relatively small issues such as the entertainment deduction 
to foundational questions about the effect of marginal tax rates on labor supply and 
even the effect of tax policies on taxpayer health. Perhaps one reason that the 
possibility of tax experiments has been neglected is that it seems politically 
implausible that the government would randomly assign taxpayers to different tax 
rates, let alone assign different municipalities to different tax rules. This Article’s 
ambition has been to show that more modest tax experimentation, featuring 
revenue-neutral designs and voluntary participation, might sometimes be possible, 
and that interpretive challenges can be addressed. Initial forays involving discrete 
code provisions could lead to voluntary experiments in which taxpayers receive 
some tax rate reward in exchange for their willingness to being assigned to any of 
many tax treatments. Such a program could increase the odds that the next great tax 
reform is based on a solid foundation of evidence. 
                                                 
Center for Health Statistics, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/index.htm (providing information on the 
Center). 
241 See supra Part II.C.2. 
242 I.R.C. § 1(d) (allowing married individuals to file a return that is not join with his or her spouse).   
243 See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (example of such an arrangement).   
